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REGULATING RISK AND GOVERNANCE IN BANKS: 
A CONTRACTARIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Simone M. Sepe∗ 
In the lead up to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, U.S. banks engaged in 
systemic, excessive risk taking that drove the economy to the verge of collapse. 
This Article makes three contributions to understanding how this pandemic of 
excessive bank risk taking was possible and which policy reforms are desirable 
to promote more prudent banking conduct. 
First, this Article counters the common narrative that blames the crisis on 
managerial moral hazard. Instead, it focuses on bank shareholders and 
debtholders, arguing that their distorted incentives drove banks to take 
excessive risks. Corporate finance theory teaches that debtholders charge 
higher interest rates in response to the shareholders’ preferences for high-risk, 
high-return projects. In highly leveraged firms, this incentivizes shareholders, 
eager to minimize the cost of debt, to seek safe governance arrangements that 
can commit their firms to sound risk choices. But in the banking sector, deposit 
insurance and bailouts undermine this balance, causing debtholders to become 
less sensitive to risk taking. As a result, bank shareholders, shielded by limited 
liability and unconstrained by debtholder monitoring, rationally support 
governance arrangements that incentivize risk taking. 
This Article’s second contribution is normative: it develops a contractarian 
approach to bank regulation in order to overcome the distortions that affect 
bank governance. Under this approach, regulators should assume the 
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hypothetical position of bank debtholders in a world without safety nets, and 
they should discipline banks as debtholders would in such a world. Where 
debtholders would offer lower interest rates in exchange for safer governance, 
regulators would offer lower capital requirements and lower deposit insurance 
premiums while demanding the same governance concessions. By promoting 
more socially responsible risk taking, this policy reform would add to bank 
safety and overall economic stability. 
Finally, this Article provides a conceptual foundation for designing and 
implementing safe governance arrangements in banks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The events leading up to the banking crisis of 2007–2008 have been 
extensively publicized.1 Most U.S. banks made huge investments in the highly 
remunerative subprime market, while disregarding the enormous risks 
associated with these investments. When those risks finally materialized, they 
almost drove the U.S. banking system to collapse.2 What is still puzzling, 
however, is how this was possible. Which failure can explain systematic, 
excessive risk taking by all of the U.S. banks? 
One popular answer points to the failure of bank governance. On this view, 
rapacious bank CEOs usurped the corporate governance mechanisms that 
should have protected bank investors from excessive risk taking.3 This 
usurpation produced a system of skewed incentive schemes, complacent risk 
managers, and captured boards that allowed a pervasive culture of risk taking 
to flourish. This narrative, however, reflects an inadequate understanding of 
corporate governance theory and practice. It does not account for the causal 
relationship between external and internal governance. External governance is 
defined here as the pressure of oversight demands and backroom influence 
exercised by shareholders and debtholders.4 These interactions directly inform 
 
 1 Most of the books that have appeared in the aftermath of the crisis to analyze its causes include a 
detailed account of these events. See, e.g., DARREL DUFFIE, HOW BIG BANKS FAIL AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT 
IT (2011); SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT 
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2011); RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL 
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, 
FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010). 
 2 By one estimate, the amount of public money spent to counter the collapse of the banking system 
approached 80% of U.S. GDP, i.e., about $12 trillion. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 110 (citing Mark Pittman 
& Bob Ivry, Fed’s Strategy Reduces U.S. Bailout to $11.6 Trillion, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2009, 4:39 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a3mpIdYuoB0M). More recent sources, 
however, have suggested that $13 trillion was the maximum level of taxpayer funds that were potentially at 
risk, and not an actual figure of the losses imposed by the crisis. See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, 
Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1414 
n.134 (2011). 
 3 See sources quoted infra at note 93.  
 4 Shareholder and debtholder governance can be grouped together as external disciplinary forces coming 
from capital markets. In this respect, three caveats are in order. First, capital market discipline has traditionally 
been limited to the market for corporate control—the trading of equity interests including both economic and 
control rights over the corporation. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 
73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965). In recent years, however, an extensive scholarship has developed on the 
active control exercised by creditors on their borrowers both through market and contractual mechanisms. See, 
e.g., George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 
CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1077 (1995) (providing a seminal contribution on the interaction between debtholder and 
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internal governance, which comprises the organizational rules and bodies that 
discipline the corporate decision-making process—features including the board 
of directors, compensation schemes, and internal control procedures.5 
Understanding this causal relationship has more than mere theoretical 
implications: the interplay between external and internal governance exposes 
which regulatory approaches are cosmetic and which approaches can 
meaningfully constrain risk taking and preserve banking stability. 
Adopting the conceptual framework above, this Article makes two 
important contributions: first, providing a causal analysis of the financial crisis, 
and second, developing a normative case for the future regulation debate.6 The 
 
shareholder governance); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Essay, Private Debt and the Missing 
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1217 (2006) (arguing that an aggressive use of 
covenants can “obliterate the difference between debt and equity”); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board 
Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 115 (2009) 
(stating that “the extent of private lender influence rivals that of conventional governance mechanisms”). 
Second, it is important to note that classifying shareholder actions as external or internal to the corporate 
decision-making process is not always straightforward. Indeed, because of the special status enjoyed by 
shareholders as residual claimants, corporate law provides them with several institutional means to directly 
influence corporate decision making. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. However, in large 
corporations with dispersed shareholders, the exercise of these institutional means is mostly mediated by 
management, to whom shareholders delegate operational and decisional authority over corporate affairs. To 
this extent, shareholder governance is external to the corporate organization. See William R. Baber & Lihong 
Liang, Associations Between Internal and External Corporate Governance Characteristics and the 
Consequences of Regulating Governance Practices 2 (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1146922 (“External governance defines the role of shareholder oversight . . . . In contrast, 
internal governance systems concern the interaction between or among firm insiders, specifically, 
management, directors, and employees.”). Instead, in corporations with controlling shareholders, shareholder 
governance is better described as internal because blockholders directly participate in the corporate decision-
making process. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices, 60 J. 
FIN. 2859, 2859–60 (2005). Finally, in addition to capital markets, managerial labor markets and product 
markets also serve as sources of external discipline. See Triantis & Daniels, supra at 1075–76. While the 
analysis of managerial labor market discipline is outside the scope of this Article, it is important to observe 
that, in the particular case of banks, disciplinary forces coming from product markets and capital markets are 
largely overlapping. This is because the largest component of banks’ creditors—bank depositors—also are the 
most important consumers of the special good that banks produce: i.e., liquidity. 
 5 Internal control procedures generally include auditing and accounting functions. But in the case of 
banks, risk management—the process through which a bank identifies, controls, and makes informed decisions 
about the risk affecting its operations—provides the most important internal control function. See Christine M. 
Cumming & Beverly J. Hirtle, The Challenges of Risk Management in Diversified Financial Companies, 
ECON. POL’Y REV., Mar. 2001, at 1, 2 (expounding on the importance of risk management in modern financial 
corporations, e.g., banks). 
 6 This Article uses the term bank differently within the positive and normative analyses that it develops. 
In the positive analysis of the dynamics that led to the crisis, the term bank is used to identify collectively 
commercial banks, stand-alone investment banks, and universal banks. In the normative analysis, the term 
bank identifies bank holding companies. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) 
(2006) (defining a “bank holding company” as “any company which has control over any bank or over any 
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analytical component reframes the crisis as a moral hazard problem involving 
bank shareholders and debtholders, rather than bank managers. If there were no 
safety nets—deposit insurance and bailouts—the interaction between 
shareholder and debtholder governance would help to mitigate the problem of 
excessive risk taking. Economically, this problem arises from the shareholders’ 
preferences for high-risk, high-return projects. Indeed, under the limited 
liability of the corporate form, shareholders expect to reap the full upside from 
these projects, while debtholders bear most of the downside risk.7 Anticipating 
these circumstances, debtholders demand higher interest rates, which reduce 
expected equity returns.8 In response, shareholders have incentives to appease 
debtholders by committing their firms to sound risk policies9—for example 
through the managerial negotiation of contractual covenants that give 
debtholders authority to influence corporate decision making.10 This Article 
suggests that in banks, absent safety nets, this implicit shareholder–debtholder 
negotiation over a firm’s risk choices would lead shareholders to seek internal 
governance arrangements that can distinguish their firms as safe investments. 
But with the introduction of safety nets, debtholders become less sensitive to 
risk taking. This leads to a theory of rational passivity of bank shareholders—
unconstrained by debt discipline, bank shareholders have no incentives to 
police governance arrangements that induce risk taking.11 Instead, they find 
themselves benefitting from such arrangements. 
 
company that is or becomes a bank holding company”). The transformation of Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley—the sole large investment banks that survived the crisis—into bank holding companies justifies this 
choice. Indeed, this change virtually put an end to the era of the independent investment bank, giving these 
firms access to deposit funding in return for being subject to stricter regulation. See Press Release, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies (Sept. 21, 
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/20080922a.htm. 
 7 The standard economic reference on the debt–equity conflict over a firm’s risk choices is Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334–37 (1976). 
 8 The maximization of shareholders’ returns depends on both the managerial selection of profitable 
investment projects (i.e., the exercise of managerial effort) and the minimization of a firm’s costs, including 
the cost of debt. See Teresa A. John & Kose John, Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure, 48 
J. FIN. 949, 951 (1993) (“As residual claimholders, the shareholders gain from the reduced agency costs of 
debt.”). 
 9 Cf. Kose John et al., A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation, 13 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 95, 96 (2000) (suggesting that when debt is properly priced, the shareholders’ ex ante commitment to 
contractual solutions that can induce managers to implement value-maximizing investment policies is in the 
shareholders’ best interest). 
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 139–40 (describing the various forms of debt covenants that are 
most commonly used as a firm’s commitment to sound risk choices). 
 11 Cf. Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 
1152–53 (2010) (suggesting that bank managers’ engagement in the particular opportunism hazard presented 
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To counter these distorted incentives, this Article suggests that bank 
regulators should adopt a contractarian approach, assuming the hypothetical 
position of uninsured bank debtholders. In this position, they would bargain for 
the same governance concessions from shareholders that debtholders would 
otherwise demand.12 Where debtholders would offer lower interest rates in 
exchange for safer governance, regulators would offer lower regulatory costs 
while demanding the same governance concessions. Redirecting bank 
investors’ incentives toward more socially responsible risk taking, this system 
would promote overall economic stability. 
Methodology-wise, the contractarian approach proposed by this Article 
involves a counterfactual analysis of what would be banks’ governance 
arrangements absent safety nets. “High-leveraged corporations”13 provide the 
right benchmark to develop this analysis because banks fit into this paradigm. 
Observation from the private debt sector as well as the venture capital sector 
confirms that the implicit shareholder–debtholder negotiation over a firm’s risk 
choices produces special governance arrangements in these corporations.14 
Indeed, higher leverage increases shareholders’ expected returns from riskier 
projects, while simultaneously increasing debtholders’ exposure to losses.15 In 
these circumstances, debt covenants may fail to adequately protect 
debtholders’ investment expectations. Hence, shareholders of high-leverage 
 
by contingent debt was in the interest of bank shareholders and, therefore, perfectly rational from the 
shareholders’ perspective). 
 12 The contractarian approach developed by this Article draws on the insights of economists Mathias 
Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, who suggested that bank regulators should act as representatives of bank 
depositors. See MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS 31–32 
(1993). For Dewatripont and Tirole, however, the role of bank regulation is to protect small depositors, who 
are described as unable to exercise adequate control on their banks. See id. In contrast, this Article’s 
contractarian approach rests on the idea that the rationale for bank regulation is protecting the integrity of the 
banking infrastructure. Accordingly, while Dewatripont and Tirole articulated a representation hypothesis of 
bank regulation in the interest of depositors, this Article develops a substitution hypothesis of this regulation in 
the interest of society as a whole. Under this different hypothesis, the role for bank regulators is to redress the 
distortions produced in banks’ governance mechanisms by safety nets, substituting for insured and, therefore, 
opportunistic debtholders in disciplining banks. See infra Part III.B. Moreover, Dewatripont and Tirole’s 
analysis was largely unconcerned with banks’ internal governance arrangements, which represents a major 
focus of this Article’s discussion. 
 13 In this Article, the term high-leveraged corporations identifies corporations that employ financing 
having priority over common stock as their main source of capital. These forms of financing may include, for 
example, preferred shares, subordinated debt, and other hybrid financial instruments. 
 14 See infra notes 162–67 and accompanying text. 
 15 Because high leverage increases the asymmetry of payoffs from risky projects, even the undertaking of 
value-decreasing projects may be privately optimal for shareholders. That is, high leverage tends to transform 
the debt–equity conflict over a firm’s risk choices from a distributive problem into an allocative problem. See 
infra Part I.A.1. 
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firms need a stronger commitment to sound risk policies than a majority of 
their corporate counterparts. This stronger commitment comes in the form of 
safe governance arrangements.16 The distinguishing feature of such 
arrangements is the incorporation of the debtholders’ risk preferences into the 
corporate decision-making process, typically through the appointment of a 
debtholder representative to the board. This appointee serves as a 
counterweight to the CEO, who, in response to the common use of equity-
based executive compensation, shares the same preferences of risk-liking 
shareholders.17 The result of this adversarial interaction between the CEO and 
the debtholders’ appointee is that the board’s decisional outcomes are less 
likely to be biased toward increased risk taking, as happens under the 
majoritarian “CEO-centric governance model” where firms’ informational 
flow is controlled by risk-liking CEOs.18 
Consistent with this practice, this Article suggests that in an ideal 
contracting world banks’ governance arrangements would be built around an 
organizational model based on antagonistic information gathering and 
contrarian thinking—what economists call an advocacy model.19 Banks could 
replicate a similar decision-making structure through two basic organizational 
features. The first is the appointment of a “representative” of the debtholders’ 
interests within the bank, for example an insider whose payoff structure is 
selected to align her risk preferences with the debtholders’ preferences. In 
accordance with recent international banking guidelines that stress the 
importance of risk management as a primary internal control mechanism,20 the 
 
 16 Recent economic studies suggest that the choice of better governance would be a standard means firms 
could use to lower their cost of debt. See Viral V. Acharya & Paolo F. Volpin, Corporate Governance 
Externalities, 14 REV. FIN. 1, 3 (2010) (“If firms need capital to invest, for example, via a public offering, firms 
are forced to choose a high level of governance to meet investors’ demand (formally, to meet investors’ 
participation constraint).”). This observation reinforces this Article’s thesis because the higher the level of 
leverage, the higher the need for better governance. 
 17 Shareholders, as residual claimants, are concerned that managers will pursue selfish interests rather 
than exert effort to maximize profits for the firm. The use of equity-based compensation mitigates this problem 
by aligning manager and shareholder interest through stock, stock options, or other similar instruments. But it 
also gives managers their own reasons to prefer riskier projects, to the detriment of debtholders and potentially 
to society as a whole. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing in greater detail the effects of equity-based compensation 
on risk taking in the banking sector). 
 18 It is important to observe that an analogous result occurs when the corporation is controlled by a 
blockholder. Accordingly, this Article uses the term CEO-centric governance model to identify both the 
governance model of centralized-management corporations with a dominant CEO and that of controlled 
corporations with a controlling blockholder. 
 19 See sources quoted infra at note 174.  
 20 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PRINCIPLES FOR 
ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17–18 (2010) [hereinafter BASEL PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNANCE], 
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chief risk officer (CRO) emerges as a natural candidate for the role. A fully 
independent board of directors is the additional feature envisioned by this 
Article as defining advocacy in banks. This feature would be necessary to 
preserve the board’s ability to act as an impartial decision maker in reviewing 
the competing cases for risk advanced by the CEO and the CRO. 
With the introduction of governmental insurance, however, safe bank 
governance is lost. Due to the opportunistic abandonment by debtholders of 
their monitoring function, shareholders have no incentives to put safe 
governance arrangements—such as an advocacy system—into effect. This 
account of bank governance dynamics not only replaces the view that 
managerial opportunism has been the central cause of excessive bank risk 
taking, but it also suggests a new direction for regulatory reform. Presently, 
regulators focus on capital requirements to constrain risk taking in the banking 
sector in the belief that higher equity levels can make riskier projects 
unprofitable for both shareholders and equity-compensated managers.21 But 
this is a crude and socially expensive solution, which fails to give bank 
shareholders incentives to move away from CEO-centric, and risk-prone, 
governance models. This Article proposes a richer response. It suggests that 
regulators should expand the set of regulatory tools they use to discipline 
banks, encouraging the adoption of safe governance arrangements. To this end, 
they should make banks’ regulatory costs—capital requirements and deposit 
insurance premiums—sensitive to banks’ organizational features. In practice, 
they should allow banks to trade safe governance features for lower regulatory 
costs. For example, banks opting for an advocacy-based governance model 
could be held to the 8% minimum capital ratio currently required for 
“adequately capitalized” banks.22 In contrast, banks that maintain a CEO-
centric governance model could be held to the higher 10% capital ratio that is 
required for a bank to be “well capitalized.”23 
The remainder of this Article develops these ideas in four parts. Part I 
describes the economics of risk taking in banks and the potential systemic 
 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf. The Basel Committee is a committee of bank supervisory 
authorities established within the Bank for International Settlements, whose mission is to promote international 
harmonization of banking regulations and, in particular, bank capital regulation. See About the Basel 
Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2012).  
 21 See infra text accompanying notes 231–32. 
 22 See 12 C.F.R. § 225 (2012) (setting capital ratios for U.S. banks); see also infra note 229 (providing an 
overview of the basic principles of U.S. capital regulation). 
 23 See 12 C.F.R. § 225. 
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effects it may produce. Part II describes the theory and the practice of banks’ 
governance mechanisms. Part III proposes a contractarian approach to bank 
regulation reform. Throughout, this Article relies on insights from contract 
theory, which provide the economic foundation for studying how asymmetric 
information affects agents’ interaction,24 and a series of stylized examples, 
which serve as practical illustrations of the problems therein discussed.25 
I. MORAL HAZARD AND LIQUIDITY PRODUCTION 
Banks’ ability to operate on short-term liabilities—both in the form of 
deposits and deposit-like products26—makes them the most important 
providers of liquidity in the economy.27 On the other hand, this same business 
model exacerbates risk taking. With access to deposit funding, banks are able 
to carry far more leverage than non-banking organizations. And with high 
leverage, shareholders are incentivized to take more risk because the downside 
is disproportionately borne by debtholders.28 In modern banking, this 
fundamental imbalance is aggravated by several factors, including the 
widespread use of equity-based schemes to compensate bank managers, high 
interbank correlation, and the increased opportunities for risk taking created by 
financial innovation. 
 
 24 For an introductory overview of contract theory and its basic results, see PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS 
DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY (2005). 
 25 The Article also generalizes these numerical examples with a model in the footnotes. See infra note 38 
(providing the basic setting of this model). 
 26 Historically, access to deposit funding had been restricted to commercial banks since the Glass-
Steagall Act prevented investment banks from engaging in deposit-taking activities. See Banking Act of 1933, 
ch. 89, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184–85, 188, 189, 194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.). However, with the liberalization of investment services by the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, many 
U.S. banks turned into universal banks engaged in both commercial and investment banking. See Pub. L. No. 
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Matthew 
Richardson et al., Large Banks and the Volcker Rule, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 189–91 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011). Moreover, 
after the 2007–2008 crisis, the transformation of the surviving investment banks (i.e., Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley) into bank holding companies has extended access to traditional deposit funding even to these 
banks. See supra note 6. It is worth observing, however, that even before this institutional transformation, 
banks of all types had already found ways to synthetically replicate deposit funding. See infra notes 87–88 and 
accompanying text (discussing the progressive increase in modern banking of the use of deposit-like products, 
such as repurchase agreements and commercial papers). 
 27 While “liquidity cannot easily be apprehended through a single statistic[],” in general it can be defined 
as capital that is available for investments and takes the form of either stores of value (i.e., cash) or real claims 
(i.e., credit). See Jean Tirole, Illiquidity and All Its Friends, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 287, 288–90 (2011). 
 28 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 7, at 334–37 (illustrating risk incentives of equityholders when a 
firm’s capital structure includes debt). 
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This Part discusses these problems and explains how their coincidence 
during the financial turmoil of 2007–2008 almost led the financial system to 
collapse. 
A. Moral Hazard in Banks  
Several types of financial entities produce liquidity. The special business 
model of banks, however, gives them a comparative advantage over other 
liquidity providers. In economic parlance, this model is called asset 
transformation29 because banks raise funds by issuing highly liquid claims, in 
the form of demand deposits, which they “transform” (i.e., invest) in illiquid 
assets such as medium- to long-term loans.30 This business model, however, 
also has less desirable consequences. For one thing, it leaves banks vulnerable 
to runs31 by exposing them to high funding liquidity risk, that is, the risk of 
being unable to service liquid liabilities due to asset illiquidity.32 No bank has 
sufficient funds to satisfy en masse demands for withdrawal because the 
majority of its deposits are invested in illiquid loans. Hence, a rumor about a 
bank’s financial instability or a sudden decline in asset value may give rise to a 
 
 29 See, e.g., Philip Strahan, Liquidity Production in 21st Century Banking 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 13798, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1092846. 
 30 A liquid investment (i.e., claim) is “one that the investor can convert into cash at a price [equal or] 
close to the present value of the future cash flows of the investment whenever the investor so desires.” 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the 
Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks’ Assets and Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 7 (1995). Banks can 
maintain this structural mismatch between illiquid assets and liquid liabilities because of their superior ability 
to generate private information about specific borrowers and diversify risk among many borrowers. See 
Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 393 (1984) 
(Swed.) (developing a formal analysis of the informational advantages of financial intermediaries). 
 31 The seminal model of financial intermediation and bank runs was developed by Douglas W. Diamond 
and Philip H. Dybvig. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 402–03 (1983). 
 32 The concept of funding liquidity risk concerns the distinction, recently introduced in economic theory, 
between funding liquidity and market liquidity. See Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Market 
Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2201 (2009) (introducing this distinction with respect to 
security markets). Funding liquidity involves raising cash on the liability side by borrowing funds, such as 
when a bank issues deposits or long-term debt. In contrast, market liquidity involves generating cash on the 
asset side by marketing assets, such as when a bank sells T-bills or other easily tradable assets. See Tirole, 
supra note 27, at 288–89. Accordingly, funding liquidity risk “arises when it is prohibitively expensive both to 
(i) borrow more funds (low funding liquidity) and (ii) sell off its assets (low market liquidity).” MARKUS 
BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., INT’L CTR. FOR MONETARY & BANKING STUDIES, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 13–14 (2009). Because of their business model, banks are inherently exposed to more 
severe funding liquidity risk than non-banking organizations. Indeed, bank assets have lower market liquidity 
than industrial firms’ assets, and bank liabilities are considerably more liquid than industrial firms’ liabilities. 
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collective action problem among depositors. Although depositors might be 
better off by not withdrawing their funds, their inability to coordinate, paired 
with their fear that liquidity reserves will soon be exhausted, will induce them 
to run on the bank.33 And because of their destabilizing effects, runs can 
become self-fulfilling prophecies and force even a solvent bank into 
bankruptcy.34 
But runs are not the only risk of the asset transformation model. This 
structure also leads banks to have highly leveraged capital structures. And this, 
as explained below, makes increased risk taking the crucial agency problem in 
banks. 
1. Risk Preferences of Bank Shareholders 
The problem of increased risk taking arises out of the divergent risk 
preferences of debtholders and shareholders. Debtholders have a fixed claim to 
the corporate income stream and a right of priority of payment over 
equityholders. This makes their payoff schedule concave. This means that, on 
the one hand, debtholders are largely indifferent to increases in returns from 
corporate assets, but, on the other hand, they are highly sensitive to declines in 
asset value. In response, debtholders prefer conservative investment strategies, 
which better preserve asset value. On the contrary, shareholders have a convex 
payoff schedule. As residual corporate claimants, they are highly sensitive to 
increases in equity returns. But because of the protection of limited liability, 
they are indifferent to any loss beyond the value of their capital contribution. 
Given this payoff structure, once a corporation has issued debt, shareholders 
have incentives to engage in asset substitution—to substitute riskier, more 
volatile assets for safer ones, transferring wealth from the debtholders to 
themselves.35 Indeed, shareholders expect to capture the higher upside 
potential of riskier investments in full. In contrast, any loss produced by these 
investments beyond the value of equity is borne by the debtholders. 
 
 33 See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 31, at 403. 
 34 See id. at 402 (“[B]ank runs cause real economic problems because even ‘healthy’ banks can 
fail . . . .”). 
 35 Asset substitution is not the only means through which shareholders can act opportunistically against 
debtholders. Other actions that may illegitimately transfer wealth from debtholders to stockholders include the 
payment of excessively large dividends, the issuance of additional debt, and the rejection of projects with a 
positive net present value when the benefits from such projects accrue solely to the debtholders. See Clifford 
W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 
117, 118–19 (1979). 
SEPE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2013 9:57 AM 
2012] REGULATING RISK AND GOVERNANCE IN BANKS 339 
Shareholders’ incentives for asset substitution increase with the debt-to-
equity ratio: the higher this ratio, the greater the measure to which losses are 
borne by debtholders rather than shareholders. This explains why bank 
shareholders have greater incentives for asset substitution than shareholders of 
non-banking corporations.36 To better see this, it is useful to introduce here a 
basic numerical example that this Article uses, with subsequent modifications, 
to examine the many nuances of risk taking in banks. In the analysis of this 
example and all its subsequent modifications, it is assumed that there are three 
periods of time. In period one, Bank Alpha, having $10 of equity capital, can 
invest in Project	I (i.e., the base project). Project	I requires an initial outlay of 
$100 and generates gross return of $120 with probability 90% and zero 
otherwise. To raise the capital needed to pursue Project	I, Bank Alpha issues 
debt (to depositors and other debtholders) for a face value of $100—with 
$90	being the principal amount needed to fund Project	I and $10	being the 
interest portion.37 In period two (i.e., after the issuance of debt), an alternative 
investment opportunity may become available to Bank Alpha. Finally, in 
period three, returns from the investment are generated and debt (i.e., capital 
plus interest) must be repaid in a lump sum with priority.38 Figure 1 below 
summarizes the timeline of these actions and events. 
 
 36 It is worth emphasizing, however, that the risk of asset substitution may be severe in non-banking 
firms too. Many publicly held corporations besides banks operate largely on debt, including corporations in the 
following industries: auto and truck, property management, natural gas utility, advertising, electric utility 
(central), homebuilding, maritime, newspaper, office equipment/supplies, packaging and container, power, 
publishing, and trucking. See Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
189, 209 (2011). Moreover, in the vicinity of insolvency, asset substitution becomes a threat for any type of 
firm because the firm’s equityholders no longer have any expected liquidation interest. Therefore, they prefer 
“any share of a favorable outcome to the zero return” they otherwise expect to receive. Barry E. Adler, 
Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 463 n.99 (1992). 
 37 The examples in Part I of this Article focus on the incentives of equityholders (i.e., both shareholders 
and equity-based compensated managers) for increased risk taking. In other terms, these examples assume 
away the consequences that arise from the debtholders’ rational anticipation of such incentives, postponing this 
discussion until Part II.B. Accordingly, the basic setting described in the text above assumes that the interest 
portion on Bank Alpha’s debt (i.e.,	$10) is negotiated in competitive debt markets (i.e., under a zero-profit 
condition) and is given by the debtholders’ participation constraint. The participation constraint (or individual 
rationality constraint) is a property of optimal agency contracts and is satisfied when the contract leaves all 
participants at least as well off as they would have been if they had not participated. See BERNARD SALANIÉ, 
THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 122 (2d ed. 2005). 
 38 The basic example and its subsequent modifications use binominal distribution to represent the 
problem of risk taking in banks. This problem, however, can be more rigorously represented through the 
property of second-order stochastic dominance, which compares distributions based on relative riskiness or 
dispersion. Mathematically, this can be expressed by observing that if two distributions   ∙  and   ∙  have the 
same mean (i.e.,   x dF x 	=  x dG x ), distribution   ∙  is riskier than distribution   ∙  if 
      	     ≥      	    , where ξ ∙  is a concave and invertible function. See generally ANDREU MAS-
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Since this first example focuses on the different risk preferences of banks’ 
shareholders and debtholders,39 assume, for the moment, that Bank Alpha is 
run by a shareholder manager. Further assume that  	  	(i.e., the asset 
substitution project), which generates gross return of $150	with probability 
72% and zero otherwise, is the additional project that may become available to 
Bank Alpha in period two. Note that Project	I	 and Project	II	 have the same 
net present value: 90%[$120]− $100 = 72%[$150]− $100 = $8. Project	II, 
however, is riskier than Project	I, since its standard deviation is higher 
(Project	II has a standard deviation of 67.35, while Project	I has a standard 
deviation of 36).40 This means that	Project	II is more likely to jeopardize the 
repayment of debt than Project	I. For Bank Alpha’s shareholders, however, 
 
COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 197 (1995). To this extent, second-order stochastic dominance 
better captures the concept of tail risk, i.e., risk that occurs “in the tail of the probability distribution.” RAJAN, 
supra note 1, at 137. Indeed, we can say that   ∙ 	is generated from   ∙  by taking the mass from an interval of 
the distribution and transferring such mass to the endpoints of the interval. See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra, at 
198. This implies that the examples in the text can be formalized by using second-order stochastic dominance 
with discrete distributions, as in Bruno Biais & Catherine Casamatta, Optimal Leverage and Aggregate 
Investment, 54 J. FIN. 1291 (1999). Under this more rigorous rendering of the problem of risk, the basic setting 
is as follows. At   , Bank Alpha, having equity E, has the opportunity to invest in Project	I, which requires an 
outlay of 1. Project	I, as well as the investment opportunities that can materialize for Bank Alpha in a 
following period (i.e.,   ), has three equiprobable states: a high state, a medium state, and a low state, with the 
following payoff: H>M>L. Project I has a positive net present value: 
 
 
   + +    = V and V− 1 > 0. To 
raise the capital needed to pursue Project	I, Bank Alpha issues debt D, where D+ E = 1 and H>D>L. Under 







    = D, from which    =
     
  
. Finally,   1+     =   is the face value that 
must be repaid to the debtholders at maturity (i.e.,   ).  
 39 The property of second-order stochastic dominance perfectly explains the risk preferences of 
shareholders and debtholders: debtholders have a concave schedule like ξ ∙ , while shareholders have a convex 
schedule. Therefore, the following condition applies to Bank Alpha’s shareholders: 
        	              	    . 
 40 The higher risk of Project	II can be generalized by requiring that the possible realizations of this 
project are as follows: the probability of the medium state is reduced by      +      <
 
 
, the probability of the 
high state is increased by    , and the probability of the low state is increased by    . Accordingly, Project	II	 
is characterized by a riskier distribution, which is dominated in the sense of second-order stochastic 
dominance:       −   =       −   . 
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Project	II is more profitable than Project	I because they expect to reap the 
higher returns of Project	II with limited liability for its potential losses. 
Consider the expected payoff to the shareholders from the two projects: under 
Project	I the shareholders expect to receive 90%[$120− $100] = $18, while 
under Project	II	 they expect to receive 72%[$150− $100] = $36. Hence, 
the shareholders always prefer to substitute Project	II for Project	I as long as 
Project	II materializes, which will expropriate wealth equal to (90%−
72%)$100 = $18 from the debtholders.41 Figure 2 below summarizes the 
essential data of the asset substitution example. 
 
But the transfer of wealth from debtholders to shareholders is not the only 
effect produced by increased risk taking. Instead, this problem may also lead to 
a reduction in total wealth. If leverage is high enough to shift most of the 
potential losses from these projects to the debtholders, even risky projects that 
will reduce the total value of the firm can still be profitable from the 
shareholders’ perspective. The following variation on the above example better 
illustrates the difference between asset substitution and this more severe form 
of shareholder opportunism, which is referred to as excessive risk taking. In 
this case, assume that after Bank Alpha has issued debt to fund Project	I, the 
opportunity for Bank Alpha to invest in   	    (i.e., the excessive-risk-
taking project) may become available.   	    generates a gross return of 
$180 with probability 55% and zero otherwise. As with   	   above, 
  	    is riskier than    	  (indeed,   	    has a standard 
deviation of 89.5, while   	  has a standard deviation of only 36). Unlike 
  	  , however,   	   	has a net present value of negative $1 (i.e., 
 
 41 This result can be generalized by observing that the shareholders transfer wealth from the debtholders 
to themselves for an amount equal to       −    when they substitute Project	II for Project	I. 
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55%[$180]− $100 = −$1).42 Hence, substituting   	    for   	  
generates a social loss of $9.43 This obviously makes   	    a bad project 
for Bank Alpha and society as a whole. Yet, the expected payoff to the 
shareholders with   	    is higher than with   	 : 55%[$180−
$100] = $44 > $18. Thus, regardless of the social loss produced by the 
undertaking of   	   , the shareholders will always prefer to substitute 
  	    for     	 , if   	    materializes.44 Figure 3 below 
summarizes the essential data of the excessive-risk-taking example. 
 
For simplicity, the examples above have assumed that shareholders 
exercise direct control over the corporate decision-making process. In reality, 
however, most large U.S. banks are organized as centralized management 
corporations,45 where managers rather than shareholders make corporate 
decisions. The next section develops the analysis of the problem of bank risk 
taking with a discussion of bank managers’ risk incentives. 
 
 42 The features of  	    (i.e., higher risk and lower present value than  	 ) can be 
generalized by requiring that the possible realizations of this project are as follows: the probability of the 
medium state is reduced by      +      where 
 
 
>       +      	  >      +     	 , the probability of the high state 
is increased by      <    , and the probability of the low state is increased by      >    , such that 
      −   −        −   > 0. 
 43 Substituting  	    for  	  increases the shareholders’ expected payoff by a positive 
amount        −  −       −    and decreases the debtholders’ expected payoff by        −    >
 
      −  −       −   . 
 44 This result can be generalized by observing that the shareholders will prefer  	    over 
 	 	as long as   
 
+  

















 45 See Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 
263 (2009) (providing a cross-country analysis of bank ownership structures and finding that all the U.S. banks 
in their representative sample are widely held). 
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2. Risk Preferences of Bank Managers 
Unlike diversified investors, managers make specific investments in their 
corporations, which they are unlikely to recoup in case of failure.46 This 
explains why corporate finance scholarship has generally described managers 
as more risk averse than shareholders.47 Consistent with this view, discussions 
of the problem of risk taking have long been limited to a subset of the central 
agency problem: the conflict between shareholders and managers. The concern 
is that managers may pursue their own interest at the shareholders’ expense—
in the jargon of economists, exert insufficient effort.48 Managers may shirk by 
avoiding actions that involve personal costs.49 They may engage in the 
extraction of private benefits.50 And, finally, in order to protect their non-
diversified investment in the corporation, they may select projects that are too 
conservative from the shareholders’ perspective.51 
 
 46 MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 144 (2000). 
 47 See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1351 (2007) (“Managers of healthy companies generally prefer taking less risk than 
they would if they were acting in the interests of their presumptively diversified shareholders. A shareholder 
has shares in many companies; a manager has only one job.” (footnote omitted)). 
 48 In economics, the term effort is broadly used to refer to any action the agent takes to advance the 
principal’s interest. See, e.g., JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FOR 
PERFORMANCE AND GROWTH 126–27 (2004). Conversely, insufficient effort defines any action of the agent 
that does not advance the principal’s interest. 
 49 Shirking commonly takes place when managers are not fully focused on maximizing corporate profits, 
as when they exert suboptimal effort in running the business enterprise. The concept of shirking, however, 
refers “not so much to the numbers of hours spent in the office . . . but rather to the allocation of work time to 
various tasks.” See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 16 (2006). For example, managers 
may find it unpleasant to cut costs by reallocating workers, may not spend enough time supervising their 
subordinates, or may overcommit themselves to tasks unrelated to the management of the corporation. Id. 
 50 Managers extract private benefits when they exploit delegated authority to obtain benefits to the 
detriment of shareholders, such as when they divert corporate opportunities, spend corporate money to 
purchase private jets, recruit top officers from among family and friends, and so forth. See id. at 27. 
 51 See, e.g., David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 
B.C. L. REV. 435, 446 (2010) (arguing that, as it concerns the problem of risk, the focus “has generally been on 
the problem of excessive conservatism on the part of risk-averse executives”); Rebecca S. Demsetz et al., 
Agency Problems and Risk Taking at Banks 1–2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Research Paper No. 9709, 1997), 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/research_papers/9709.pdf (“[T]he 
owner/manager agency problem is characterized by excessively safe behavior on the part of the manager, who 
pursues his own objectives at the expense of better diversified shareholders.”). Indeed, conservative projects 
that reduce the variance of the outcome distribution produce the opposite effects of increased risk taking, 
expropriating wealth from shareholders to the benefit of fixed claimants, including wage-compensated 
managers. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 7, at 353. 
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Stock, stock options, and performance-based bonuses, which tie managers’ 
financial rewards to equity value through compensation, have traditionally 
been emphasized as the solution to align manager and shareholder interests.52 
This is because compensating managers with contingent equity rights makes 
them sensitive to increased equity returns, incentivizing them to exert optimal 
effort. Notably, U.S. corporate practice has adhered in full to this 
compensation paradigm, especially in the banking sector.53 From the 
debtholders’ perspective, however, equity-based compensation produces a 
negative externality, which is amplified in highly leveraged corporations, e.g., 
banks. Introducing convexity in the managers’ payoff schedules, equity-based 
compensation transforms them into agents who prefer riskier projects over 
safer projects.54 
To see this, consider again the example made above to illustrate the 
problem of excessive risk taking. In this case, assume that Bank Alpha’s 
shareholders have hired a manager to run the corporate affairs. The manager’s 
natural risk aversion (arising from her specific investment in Bank Alpha) is 
represented through a concave utility function—meaning that her marginal 
utility of wealth is decreasing.55 Specifically, suppose that the utility function 
 
 52 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Essay, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and 
Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 361 (2009) (“Until the spate of accounting scandals 
that began with Enron, compensation in the form of stock and stock options was often emphasized as a key to 
improved corporate performance . . . .”); Joshua A. Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Performance 
Compensation in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 140–41 (1995) (stating the 
traditionally dominant view that “performance pay represents the sole acceptable solution” to the problem of 
managerial effort). 
 53 Executive bonuses in the range of millions of dollars, and even tens of millions of dollars, were 
common practice in the banking sector before the crisis. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 1, at 61. In 2009, 
for example, it emerged that Citigroup owed a single executive a $100 million bonus. Id. Along the same line, 
in 2000 the average stock option award to CEOs at twenty-seven major U.S. banks was $11.9 million, 
compared to $4.5 million for CEOs in non-banking corporations. See MARK WATSON ET AL., MOODY’S 
INVESTORS SERV., DON’T BANK ON STRONG GOVERNANCE: OBSERVATIONS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
U.S. BANKS 2 (2005), available at http://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/ 
2003700000425158.pdf. In investment banking, this phenomenon was even more pronounced, with “top 
executive salaries averaging only 2% of annual total [executive] compensation across the whole peer group in 
recent years.” See NESTOR ADVISORS, GOVERNANCE IN CRISIS: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF SIX U.S. 
INVESTMENT BANKS 18 (2009) [hereinafter NESTOR REPORT]. 
 54 See Richard A. DeFusco et al., The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and 
Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617, 618 (1990) (“The asymmetric payoffs of call options make it more attractive for 
managers to undertake risky projects.”). 
 55 Under utility theory—which studies how agents make decisions based on the amount of risk they are 
willing to take to maximize their monetary income—a simple way to represent risk aversion is to assume that 
the agent’s marginal utility of wealth is decreasing. That is, risk aversion can be represented through a concave 
utility function. See ROGER B. MYERSON, PROBABILITY MODELS FOR ECONOMIC DECISIONS 83 (2005). 
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of the manager takes the form  (∙)  . This means that when the manager’s 
payoff is, for example, $8, her utility is equal to  $8  = $2.56 Finally, suppose 
that Bank Alpha’s manager is compensated through an equity-based scheme to 
induce her to exert optimal effort. 
Under these assumptions, consider how the risk preferences of the manager 
change depending on the level of convexity introduced into her payoff 
schedule through equity-based compensation. Suppose first that the manager is 
compensated with a 10%	equity stake.57 In this case, the manager will always 
choose   	  over   	   . This is so because, given the manager’s 
concave utility function, the level of convexity that a 10%	equity stake 
introduces in her payoff schedule is not enough to make   	    profitable 
for her: 90%   10%($120− $100)    > 55%   10%($180− $100)   .58 
Now, instead, suppose that the equity component of the manager’s pay 
includes a stock option package, given by the attribution of 0.2 call options. 
Each option takes the form of max[0,  − $ ].   is the equity value at period 
three. This value can be either $120− $100 = $20 with probability 90% or 
$180− $100 = $80 with probability 55% depending on whether the manager 
chooses   	  or   	   . $  is the strike price of the call option.59 
Under this different form of equity-based compensation, 
55%   0.2($180− $100− $ )    > 90%   0.2($120− $100− $ )    holds, 
as long as $  > $2.26. This means that further leveraging the payoff schedule 
of the manager by $2.26 will induce her to prefer   	    over 
  	 .60 
 
 56 The risk aversion of Bank Alpha’s manager can be generalized by considering a utility function   ∙ , 
where    ∙  > 0 and     ∙  < 0. 
 57 The equity share of Bank Alpha’s manager can be generalized by posing that the manager is paid with 
  ∈  0,1  stocks. 
 58 Formally, this condition can be expressed as follows: 
 
 










−           −    , which implies that       +           −     >
            −     holds. 
 59 This can be generalized by posing that Bank Alpha’s manager is paid with a number,   ∈  0,1 , of call 
options, such that her schedule is max 0,   −  , where   is the share value that is equal to the state contingent 
realization of the project minus  , and   is the strike price of the call option. 
 60 Mathematically, this means that it is always possible to find a value of   such that Bank Alpha’s 
manager prefers  	    to  	 . Indeed, the condition 
             −  −     >       +             −  −     is always satisfied when   >  ∗ =








    −  . For example, it is apparent that when   =  −  , the 
manager always prefers  	    to  	 . 
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This stylized example explains why increased risk taking by bank managers 
has been recognized as the most proximate cause of the recent financial 
crisis.61 Contrary to the conventional representation of managers as risk-averse 
agents, the banking sector’s reliance on highly leveraged compensation 
schemes led managers to undertake increasingly outsized bets—tail risk in the 
jargon of finance.62 When the market turned sour, these reckless bets led to 
massive losses, which were compounded by two key elements. The first is the 
inherent correlation of the banking system, which may cause increased risk 
taking at an individual bank level to produce systemic effects. The second is 
the liquidity production model of modern banking, which has drastically 
increased the opportunity for risk taking by bank managers. Section B 
addresses interbank correlation. Section C explains the modern model of 
banks’ liquidity production. 
B. Interbank Correlation 
Modern banks tend to be correlated along two dimensions: the counterparty 
risk dimension and the asset dimension. The first dimension of correlation 
arises from the high volume of interbank transactions.63 In general, these 
transactions serve to efficiently circulate liquidity in several ways, including 
intraday advances on payment systems, overnight and term bank lending, and 
derivative transactions.64 But on the other hand, interbank exposures make it 
 
 61 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1915, 1916–17 (2010) (describing managerial risk taking in banks as a major cause of the crisis); 
Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Credit Crisis: Conjectures About Causes and Remedies, 99 
AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 606, 607–08 (2009) (talking of a “culture of excessive risk taking that had 
overtaken banks” and relating this culture to the distorted incentives of top bank executives). The popular press 
also has largely embraced this view of the crisis. See, e.g., Stewart Hamilton, Boards Must Stand Up to 
Bullying CEOs, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 19, 2010, at 6 (blaming the crisis on excessive risk taking by bank 
executives). Likewise, regulators have also backed the idea that managerial risk taking largely contributed to 
the development of the crisis. See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 22, 
2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20091022a.htm (“Compensation 
practices at some banking organizations have led to misaligned incentives and excessive risk-taking, 
contributing to bank losses and financial instability . . . .”). Some scholars, however, remain skeptical of this 
explanation of the causes of the crisis. See Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and 
the Credit Crisis 22–23 (Charles A. Dice Ctr. for Research in Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1439859 (arguing that empirical evidence 
dismisses the role of pay arrangements in inducing risk taking by bank executives). 
 62 See supra note 38 (defining tail risk). 
 63 See SHELAGH HEFFERNAN, MODERN BANKING 66 (2005) (stating that interbank claims have risen from 
$1.5 trillion in 1983 to $11.1 trillion in 2000). 
 64 See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 733, 733 (1996) (discussing interbank transactions and the risks arising therefrom). 
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more likely that a decline in asset value at one bank may impose losses on 
other banks.65 The classical example is a bank that owes money to another 
bank, for example because its trading partner has unrealized gains on the 
contracts that link the two banks. Because of this contractual relationship, if 
the first bank fails, it may cause losses at the partner bank and potentially 
threaten its solvency.66 In the real world, these problems are likely to be 
compounded by simultaneity issues because banks act as both lenders and 
borrowers with their trading partners.67 Additionally, banks tend to be 
correlated along the asset dimension because their capital structures and assets 
are largely homogenous. As a result, a crisis at an individual bank may be 
interpreted by investors as a sign that similar banks are facing the same 
problems. This, in turn, can potentially induce investors to reduce their 
exposures to banks—by withdrawing their positions or demanding the posting 
of more collateral68—similar to what takes place in a traditional run by 
depositors.69 
 
 65 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4 (2000) (showing that 
the equilibrium of financial contagion depends on the degree of cross-holdings of bank deposits). 
 66 See KENNETH R. FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 46 (2010) 
[hereinafter SQUAM LAKE REPORT]. 
 67 See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Winter 2009, at 77, 96 (arguing that simultaneity issues in the interbank market have led modern 
banking to resemble an “interwoven network of financial obligations”). The widespread use of credit default 
swaps (CDS) has played a central role in the increase of simultaneity issues in interbank transactions. See 
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 950–51 (2009). CDS are a particular 
type of derivative contract where one party pays periodic fees to a counterparty in exchange for receiving a 
contingent payment upon a default event (with this payment being typically guaranteed by the posting of a 
collateral). See, e.g., id. at 947–52 (analyzing the role played by CDS in the collapse of AIG). However, while 
CDS resemble insurance contracts, a CDS buyer does not need to be exposed to the risk for which it is buying 
protection. See René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2010, at 
73, 74. Therefore, unlike insurance contracts, CDS are heavily traded. See id. Within the net of reciprocal 
exposures created by the trading of these complex instruments, simultaneity issue may also lead to network (or 
gridlock) risk “in which multiple trading parties fail to cancel out offsetting positions because of concerns 
about counterparty credit risk.” See Brunnermeier, supra, at 78. 
 68 See DUFFIE, supra note 1, at 2. Securities are the most common collateral in the banking sector. Thus, 
the posting of more collateral typically takes the form of the requirement of a higher “haircut,” which is “a 
buffer [debtholders require] for unexpected reductions in the market value of the [collateralized securities].” 
Id. 
 69 The term fire sale is used to refer to the phenomenon that occurs when a bank is forced to sell a large 
portion of its assets at a deeply discounted price in order to achieve a quicker sale and promptly satisfy the 
requests of its creditors (i.e., reduce the risk of default). See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in 
Finance and Macroeconomics, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2011, at 29, 31–32. When asset correlation is high, 
price concessions of this type are likely to produce dramatic effects because collective action problems will 
induce debtholders of other banks holding similar assets to take similar actions. See SQUAM LAKE REPORT, 
supra note 66, at 46. This, in turn, will result in a larger number of banks attempting to sell assets at the same 
time, which will “magnify the original . . . price drop and force more sales” in a perverse spiral. See id. 
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Importantly, increased risk taking at a single bank enhances the likelihood 
that this bank may experience a decline in asset value, serving as the initial 
event in a chain of contagion that may drag down correlated, but otherwise 
sound, banks.70 To see this, consider again the basic example where Bank 
Alpha can substitute   	   (i.e., the asset substitution project) for 
  	 	(i.e., the base project). Recall that the two projects have the same net 
present value. Now suppose that there is another bank, Bank Beta, which has 
$100 in assets and whose capital structure and available projects are similar to 
the capital structure and projects of Bank Alpha. Further assume that Bank 
Alpha and Bank Beta are correlated along both the counterparty risk dimension 
and the asset dimension. This implies that a decline in the asset value of Bank 
Alpha—which is represented here as Bank Alpha’s default on its outstanding 
debt—will also affect Bank Beta.71 For example, assume that if Bank Alpha 
defaults the asset value of Bank Beta will decline to zero with probability 
40%. This measure can be interpreted as the level of correlation between the 
two banks. It follows that, from a social welfare viewpoint, the undertaking of 
  	   is inefficient, despite being economically neutral for Bank Alpha. 
Indeed, the undertaking of   	   reduces the overall wealth by 
40%(90%− 72%)$100 = $7.2 (with 90% and 72% being the probability of 
success of   	  and   	   respectively).72 In fact, as long as the 
level of correlation is high enough, even a riskier project that increases the 
 
(pointing out that “[t]he size of the . . . price concession depends on how much is being sold, how quickly the 
firm wants to sell, and how many buyers are available and ready to trade”).  
 70 See Marc J. Flannery, Lecture, Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of 
the U.S. Empirical Evidence, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 273, 278 n.11 (1998) (arguing that increased 
bank risk taking can create significant negative externalities and systemic risk due to interbank correlation). 
Viral V. Acharya has extended this argument, claiming that interbank correlation increases individual banks’ 
incentives for higher risk taking by replicating the debt–equity conflict at a systemic level. See Viral V. 
Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 224, 224 
(2009) (“The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the 
health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated 
investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk.”). 
 71 Assuming that Bank Beta’s assets are  	 , the correlation between Bank Alpha and Bank Beta 
can be modeled by requiring that some mass of the distribution of  	  is shifted from the high and 




probability of the medium state is reduced by   <
 
 
, and the probability of the low state is increased by   +  . 
 72 This result can be generalized by observing that when Bank Alpha undertakes  	  , the 





−     +   
 
−     +   
 
+   +    . Hence, the undertaking of  	   by Bank Alpha 
reduces social welfare by         −   +     −    . 
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expected value of Bank Alpha may be socially inefficient.73 Thus, in contrast 
to the conventional scholarly assumption that risk taking in the banking sector 
matters mainly when it is excessive,74 this simple example shows that any ex 
post increase in bank asset risk—even when individually efficient—may 
potentially lead to social losses. The likelihood that this will occur depends on 
the level of interbank correlation. 
C. Modern Liquidity Production 
In recent decades, the growth and deepening of the securities market, the 
liberalization of banks’ investment services, and the steady progress of 
financial technologies have combined to produce major changes in banking.75 
The traditional banking model, in which banks use deposits to fund loans that 
they hold until repayment, has been increasingly supplemented by a new 
“originate and distribute” model.76 Under this new model, banks no longer 
hold loans on their balance sheets. Instead, they distribute them to investors, 
including other banks, through securitization transactions and other financing 
arrangements that can transform illiquid assets into marketable securities.77 
 
 73 To see this, consider an alternative case where at period two Bank Alpha can replace  	  (i.e., 
the base project) with  	   (i.e., the correlated project), which generates gross returns equal to $190 
with probability 60% and zero otherwise. Assume again that Bank Alpha and Bank Beta are correlated, with 
the measure of correlation between the two banks still being 40%. Note that  	   is riskier than 
 	  since it has a higher standard deviation (indeed,  	   has a standard deviation of 93.08, while 
 	  has a standard deviation of 36). However,  	   has a higher net present value than 
 	 : i.e., 60% $190 − $100 = $14 > $8. (These features of  	  —higher risk and higher 
present value than  	 —can be generalized by requiring that the probability of the medium state is 
reduced by      +      < 	
 
 
, the probability of the high state is increased by    , and the probability of the 
low state is increased by    , such that       −  −       −    = Δ   is positive.) Hence, for Bank Alpha 
the substitution of  	   for  	  is always a good decision since  	   increases the firm’s 
overall value: i.e., 60% $190 − 90% $120  = $6. And, yet, this substitution is inefficient in terms of 
aggregate wealth since the expected cost Bank Beta bears when Bank Alpha undertakes  	   exceeds 
the expected gain of Bank Alpha: i.e., 40% 90%− 60% $100 = $12 > $6. (This result can be generalized 





 74 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 255 
(2010) (limiting the analysis of the problem of managerial risk taking in banks to the undertaking of 
“actions . . . whose expected effect on the bank’s value is negative”). 
 75 See generally Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2010) 
(discussing the changes that have intervened in financial markets and the banking sector since the 1970s and 
arguing that these changes create the need to reform current financial regulation of financial intermediaries). 
 76 See, e.g., Brunnermeier, supra note 67, at 78. 
 77 See Strahan, supra note 29, at 17. Loan sales and loan syndication are additional methods that banks 
use to distribute loans, which exploded in the 1980s with the development of new credit enhancement 
techniques. See id. at 22–23.  
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In a stylized representation, the typical securitization transaction begins 
with the issuance of commercial loans—most often mortgages—by an 
originator or “downstream bank,” which basically acts as a seller of loans. In 
the second step, loans are pooled into a large portfolio, which is then 
transferred, in full or in part, to an “upstream bank” that acts as a buyer of 
loans. The third step is the actual securitization of the loans—through a special 
purpose vehicle the upstream bank issues asset-backed securities to end 
investors, using the portfolio’s cash flows to repay capital and interest to the 
investors.78 
The growth of securitization has been a primary factor behind the transition 
to a market-integrated liquidity model where banks of all types—including 
both investment and commercial (i.e., universal) banks79—jointly produce 
liquidity through a chain of interconnected bank obligations.80 Before the 
crisis, this model was touted as a way to improve the efficiency of capital 
 
 78 See Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization, in THE 
RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 560–61 (Mark Carey & René M. Stulz eds., 2006) (providing an overview 
of the mechanics of securitization). The asset-backed securities generated by the pool of loans are organized 
into senior and junior tranches having different priority of payment and different ratings. See Martin F. 
Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis, 157 
DE ECONOMIST 129, 139 (2009) (Neth.). This guarantees that senior tranches will be negatively affected by 
portfolio losses only where the “cushion” provided by the junior tranches is not enough to fully absorb these 
losses. In exchange, the interest portion paid on junior tranches virtually absorbs all the residual cash flows 
that the loan portfolio generates. See id. 
 79 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 
425 (2012) (“Securitized-banking activities were central to the operations of firms formerly known as 
investment banks (e.g. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch), but they also play 
a role at commercial banks . . . such as Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, and Bank of America.”). Given their traditional 
involvement in the issuance of loans, commercial banks (and commercial subsidiaries of universal banks) 
typically served as downstream banks in the securitization process. Stand-alone investment banks (and 
investment subsidiaries of universal banks) acted both as upstream banks and end investors in this process. 
And universal banks were involved in all stages of securitization transactions through their commercial and 
investment subsidiaries. 
 80 By granting access to a larger liquidity platform, the “originate and distribute” model has indeed 
provided more and cheaper capital to all economic actors. See Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, 
Leverage, Bubbles and the Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 242 (2010) (“[T]his 
process made a virtual avalanche of credit available to individuals and businesses.”). Political and monetary 
choices also contributed to the rapid expansion of the liquidity platform. The Federal Reserve’s long-standing 
policy of low interest rates and government policies that were designed to foster affordable housing helped 
U.S. banks to offer increasingly cheaper mortgages to their borrowers, with more and more people running to 
get a piece of the action. See Charles W. Calomiris, Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform, 29 CATO J. 
65, 67–69 (2009); see also STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 315 n.1 (stating that according to the U.S. Census Bureau 
over four million Americans became homeowners during the housing rush). As aptly observed by Margaret 
Blair, however, an excessive supply of liquidity through increased leverage of the banking system might be 
counterproductive by leading to the exponential growth of systemic risk. See Blair, supra, at 225. 
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allocation through more and better diversification.81 But the practice of 
securitization turned out to be different from the theory, largely due to 
fundamental flaws in its assumptions. 
First, securitization models vastly underestimated the risk of moral hazard. 
Within the multiple vertical chains of buyers and sellers of securitized loans, 
each bank has intrinsic incentives to take risks. With each securitization 
transaction, the seller can externalize the cost of its own risk taking to the 
buyer, which, in turn, will act as seller in another transaction, replicating the 
same moral hazard scheme. As a result of this scheme, banks were insensitive 
to the quality of securitized assets.82 Instead, they focused on increasing 
securitization volumes.83 Perversely, the expansion of lending to riskier 
borrowers and the securitization of riskier loan portfolios became rational 
investment strategies for banks.84 
Second, while end investors were not passing risk to someone else, many 
among them turned out to be other banks rather than investors with a long 
investment horizon (e.g., pension and insurance funds), as predicted by the 
theory of securitization.85 And as competition for securitization operations 
 
 81 Cf. Martin Hellwig, Banks, Markets, and the Allocation of Risks in an Economy, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL 
& THEORETICAL ECON. 328, 330 (1998) (Ger.) (“[A]bstract allocation theory provides the general principle that 
efficient risk-sharing requires a subdivision of all risks among the agents in the economy according to their 
respective degrees of risk tolerance.”). Pooling and tranching theoretically provide for larger risk sharing 
among investors. As compared to a single loan, a security that is backed by a pool of loans diversifies the risk 
of default across the different loans in the pool. And the issue of multiple tranches of asset-backed securities 
with different priority amplifies this effect by making the holders of senior tranches virtually immune from the 
default risk of the underlying loans. See Hellwig, supra note 78, at 141–42. 
 82 See, e.g., Benjamin J. Keys et al., Financial Regulation and Securitization: Evidence from Subprime 
Loans, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 700 (2009) (providing empirical evidence that securitization transactions 
produced lower credit quality). 
 83 See Hellwig, supra note 78, at 143, 166. 
 84 In principle, similar distortions in risk incentives can be mitigated by structuring the operation as an 
agency securitization, where the downstream bank (i.e., the seller) retains the equity tranches of the 
securitization operation. Indeed, the downstream bank should have incentives to select portfolios of better 
quality when it stands first in line to bear potential losses. Günter Franke & Jan Pieter Krahnen, Default Risk 
Sharing Between Banks and Markets: The Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations, in THE RISKS OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 78, at 603, 603–04, 606–07 (arguing that the originating bank’s retention 
of the “first-loss position” reduces asymmetric information and moral hazard problems affecting loan trading). 
In practice, however, most securitization operations took the form of principal securitizations, with equity 
tranches sold to outside investors. See Hellwig, supra note 78, at 145 (“Originating institutions did not, in 
general, hold the equity tranches of the portfolios that they generated; indeed, as time went on, ever greater 
portions of equity tranches were sold to outside investors.”). 
 85 See Hellwig, supra note 78, at 140 (explaining that at a theoretical level securitization should have 
shifted the funding liquidity risk inherent in the traditional banking model from originators exposed to asset 
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became more acute, banks involved in the securitization market began to take 
recourse to less costly short-term financing.86 In particular, investment banks 
began to rely heavily on repurchase agreements (repos) to better face the 
competitive pressure of universal banks, which enjoyed the comparative 
advantage of access to deposit funding.87 Because of their deposit-like features, 
repos and other forms of short-term financing allowed the rapid growth of 
banks’ balance sheets.88 But this higher leverage created additional incentives 
for risk taking. In a perverse spiral, the undertaking of risky securitization 
investments commanded more and more leverage and, in turn, induced more 
risk taking.89 Additionally, the use of short-term debt disproportionately 
increased banks’ exposure to funding liquidity risk and with it the likelihood of 
sudden requests of withdrawal by short-term creditors.90 This risk finally 
 
mismatch (i.e., high funding liquidity risk) to investors who have “long investment horizons and therefore do 
not consider [this risk] to be a risk at all”). 
 86 Cf. Brunnermeier, supra note 67, at 79–80 (suggesting that banks’ recourse to shorter maturity 
liabilities was a factor leading to the crisis). The need for less investor monitoring explains the lower cost of 
short-term debt financing. Indeed, short-term investors can price increases in risk in subsequent loans or, more 
drastically, refuse a new loan when unwilling to bear increased risk. See Mark J. Flannery, Paper, Debt 
Maturity and the Deadweight Cost of Leverage: Optimally Financing Banking Firms, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 320, 
321–22 (1994). 
 87 See Peter Hördahl & Michael R. King, Special Feature, Developments in Repo Markets During the 
Financial Turmoil, BIS Q. REV. (Switz.), Dec. 2008, at 37, 45 (observing that U.S. investment banks largely 
dominated the repo market and used repos to finance about half of their assets). Under a repo agreement, one 
party (e.g., the investment bank) sells securities to another party (e.g., the repo holder) and promises to buy the 
securities back at a higher price in the short run, in practice using the securities for collateralized borrowing. 
For an excellent discussion of the many implications of repo financing and its consequences during the crisis, 
see Gorton & Metrick, supra note 79. 
 88 In addition to repos, the use of short-term commercial papers—unsecured obligations that are issued 
for a fixed amount and bear a fixed interest rate—also added to banks’ leverage capacity, providing an 
important supplement to deposit funding. See Brunnermeier, supra note 67, at 79. In particular, before the 
crisis, this form of financing was used to finance operations of the special purpose vehicles employed in 
securitization transactions, typically with the provision of explicit or implicit guarantees by the sponsoring 
bank. See id. at 80; Strahan, supra note 29, at 26. 
 89 See Blair, supra note 80, at 277–78 (suggesting that higher leverage poses a prisoner’s dilemma: each 
bank is better off using more leverage, but all of them may become worse off if the banking system as a whole 
becomes more leveraged, because this will increase the likelihood of systemic risk). 
 90 In most cases, the settlement of repo agreements was structured to take place overnight, with 
investment banks rolling over their repo funding on a daily basis. See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Exam’r at 
3, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 433 B.R. 113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-13555), available at http:// 
jenner.com/lehman/lehman/VOLUME%201.pdf. So banks like Lehman Brothers, for example, “had to borrow 
tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in [repo] markets each day from counterparties to be able to open for 
business.” Id. 
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materialized during the crisis when short-term creditors began to deny renewal 
of their positions, causing the failure of several banks.91 
II. BANK GOVERNANCE AND RISK TAKING 
The previous Part discussed the economics of risk taking in banks and 
explained how it may lead to systemic crises. This Part examines the 
relationship between banks’ corporate governance and risk taking. Corporate 
governance is the complex set of legal, contractual, and social mechanisms by 
which corporations are organized and operated. Perhaps more important, 
corporate governance is understood as “one of the ways of regulating business 
life”92 not just within individual corporations, but for the economic system as a 
whole. It is thus unsurprising that in the aftermath of the crisis, weak bank 
governance emerged as a candidate for blame when commentators pointed to 
excessive risk taking by reckless bank managers and the harm caused to bank 
investors.93 However, while current theoretical frameworks have addressed the 
 
 91 Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers provide paradigmatic examples of the consequences of the increase 
in banks’ exposures to funding liquidity risk during the crisis. Both banks had made significant investments in 
mortgage-backed securities, relying heavily on repurchase agreements to raise the capital for these 
investments. As a result, when the rate of default on mortgage-backed securities began to increase, both banks 
suffered huge losses in the investment portfolios they used as collateral to support their funding needs. In 
response, the banks’ repo creditors required more, and more liquid, collateral. Eventually they denied rollover 
of existing agreements, essentially playing out a modern version of the classic bank run. See DUFFIE, supra 
note 1, at 13–19 (discussing the dynamics underlying the failure of Bear Stearns); SKEEL, supra note 1, at 23–
28 (discussing the failure of Lehman Brothers). 
 92 Commission Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration 
Policies, at 2, COM (2010) 284 final (Feb. 6, 2010) [hereinafter EU Green Paper on Corporate Governance]; 
see also JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2008) (“We care about corporate governance 
because it affects the real economy.”). 
 93 This view of the crisis has been equally endorsed by academics, policy analysts, and regulators both in 
the United States and Europe. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT, at xviii (2011) [hereinafter FCIC FINAL REPORT] (observing that “dramatic failures of corporate 
governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of this 
crisis”); HAMID MEHRAN ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 502, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND BANKS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS? (2011) (providing an 
excellent overview of the governance problems that have emerged from the crisis); NESTOR REPORT, supra 
note 53 (discussing corporate governance ineffectiveness in six major U.S. investment banks); STIGLITZ, supra 
note 1, at 154 (blaming the crisis on “poor corporate governance”); Kevin Dowd, Moral Hazard and the 
Financial Crisis, 29 CATO J. 141, 153–54 (2009) (arguing that the failure of corporate governance to control 
managerial moral hazard in banks was a central theme in the crisis); Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate 
Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, FIN. MARKET TRENDS, Sept. 25, 2009, at 61, 62 (arguing that 
failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements played a crucial role in the collapse of major 
financial institutions during the recent credit crisis); Report of the High-Level Grp. on Fin. Supervision in the 
EU, at 29 (2009) (concluding that corporate governance was “one of the most important failures of 
the . . . crisis”). 
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effects of governance on risk taking, they have failed to fully consider the 
relationship between external and internal governance.94 External governance 
comes from the oversight and influence that both debtholders and shareholders 
exercise over the corporation. Internal governance, instead, comprises the 
institutional arrangements that discipline the corporate decision-making 
process, such as the board of directors, compensation schemes, and risk 
management systems. Focusing on the causal relationship between external 
and internal governance reframes the failure of banks’ governance dynamics. 
Instead of blaming opportunistic bank managers, Part II addresses the moral 
hazard of the principals—opportunistic bank debtholders and shareholders. 
A theoretical analysis of the interplay between external and internal bank 
governance suggests that debt discipline would prompt bank shareholders to 
seek governance arrangements that constrain risk taking. But in the real world, 
under the protection of safety nets (i.e., deposit insurance and bailouts), bank 
debtholders become almost insensitive to risk taking and opportunistically 
avoid monitoring banks. This debtholder opportunism, in turn, points to 
shareholder opportunism as the immediate cause leading to the failure of bank 
governance. Without the constraint of debt discipline, bank shareholders, 
shielded by limited liability, benefitted from apparently weak governance 
arrangements that incentivized managerial risk taking. 
A. External and Internal Governance 
The discussion that follows briefly outlines the prevailing theoretical 
approaches to the governance of risk taking: the policy analysis approach, the 
 
It bears emphasis, however, that the attention to bank corporate governance is a recent scholarly trend. 
Traditionally, law and economics scholars have focused on the governance of non-financial institutions, 
paying little attention to the special case of bank governance. See Renée Adams, Governance and the 
Financial Crisis 5 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 248/2009, 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1398583. Two notable exceptions to this trend 
are Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 
2003, at 91, and Renée Adams & Hamid Mehran, Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding 
Companies, ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 123. For an empirical study of bank governance prior to the 
crisis, see Ross Levine, The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence 
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3404, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=625281. 
 94 A recent empirical work by Luc Laeven and Ross Levine constitutes an exception to the lack of 
scholarly attention to the role played by the interaction of external and internal bank governance in leading to 
the crisis. See Laeven & Levine, supra note 45. However, that work primarily focuses on assessing whether 
bank risk taking varies with different types of banks ownership structures (i.e., concentrated or diffused 
ownership), while this Article attempts to provide a general theory of bank governance mechanisms. 
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debt contract approach, and the optimal compensation contract approach. It 
then explains why these approaches fail to fully account for the interaction 
between external and internal governance mechanisms and why a more 
comprehensive approach is needed. 
1. The Policy Analysis Approach 
The past three years have seen an upsurge in policy reports identifying 
flawed compensation schemes, poor risk management, and ineffective board 
oversight as the salient governance weaknesses underlying the crisis. 
According to this narrative, captured, and often inexpert, board members95 
joined by complacent risk managers96 allowed CEOs to gain undisputed 
dominance over banking organizations.97 This led to a widespread system of 
excessive short-termism and “rewards for failure,” under which bank managers 
had everything to gain and nothing to lose as they piled risk after risk onto 
their portfolios.98 
Focused solely on passive boards and impotent risk managers, most of 
these reports restrict the analysis to internal governance arrangements. True to 
Berle and Means’s classic vision of the corporation, where opportunistic 
managers exercise unbridled power over the firm,99 policy analysis largely 
assumes that increased risk taking is a problem of mismanagement. In other 
words, this perspective treats the failure of bank governance as a direct 
consequence of the managers’ usurpation of internal control mechanisms to 
their own benefit. As a result, the policy response developed under this view of 
 
 95 See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to Transatlantic 
Corporate Governance Dialogue—2009 Conference (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2009/spch091709mls.htm (“[B]oards of directors did not thoroughly question the decisions of senior 
management to take on risks. Of equal concern, boards often appeared to misunderstand the gravity of risks 
taken.”). 
 96 See, e.g., FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 18 (observing that “[a]t too many financial firms, 
management brushed aside the growing risks to their firms” mostly aided by complacent chief risk officers). 
 97 See, e.g., id. at 429 (“Managers of many large and midsize financial institutions in the United States 
and Europe amassed enormous concentrations of highly correlated housing risk on their balance sheets. In 
doing so they turned a building housing crisis into a subsequent crisis of failing financial institutions.”); 
SENIOR SUPERVISORS GRP., RISK MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS OF 2008, at 4 
(2009) (suggesting that the failure of banks’ risk management can be in large part attributed to the 
unwillingness of bank managers to follow a more conservative investment approach).  
 98 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 93, at 65–77. 
 99 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1933). Notably, Berle and Means were the first to suggest that the modern public corporation 
model with dispersed shareholders may place control over the corporate affairs in the hands of self-
perpetuating management. See id. at 86–88. 
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the connection between bank governance and the crisis is a closer alignment of 
manager and shareholder interest.100 
2. The Debt Contract Approach 
Policy analysis critiques of bank governance are in clear contrast with the 
classic corporate finance theory of increased risk taking. As discussed above, 
this approach frames increased risk taking in terms of the conflicting 
investment expectations of shareholders and debtholders—a problem of 
shareholder opportunism rather than managerial opportunism.101 Put 
differently, this paradigm of risk taking assumes that managers are perfect 
agents of their principals, ignoring any issue of self-interested managerial 
behavior.102 
The direct implication of this abstraction from the shareholder–manager 
conflict is that the governance of risk taking is reduced to a principal–agent 
problem between the debtholders and the firm,103 which is treated as a 
monolithic entity that makes decisions in the same manner as an 
entrepreneur.104 Therefore, under this view, the contractual negotiation 
between the debtholders and the firm is the primary instrument that serves to 
control risk taking. This reduces the problem of a firm’s risk choices to one of 
optimal specification of the debt contract; that is, to the negotiation of optimal 
contractual constraints on the firm’s activity. 
 
 100 See infra text accompanying notes 207–09 (discussing the U.S. regulators’ subscription to this 
approach). 
 101 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 102 See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 4, at 1077 (observing that the literature on the debtholder–
shareholder conflict has developed by assuming away the shareholder–manager conflict). To the extent that it 
considers the manager–shareholder agency problem, this approach describes risk averse managers as a factor 
that may mitigate the debt–equity conflict. See Macey & O’Hara, supra note 93, at 91, 98 (suggesting that the 
risk aversion of managers acts as a “risk-reducing factor” in banks as in other corporations). 
 103 See John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 
35, 36 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (describing the agency problem that “involves the conflict 
between the firm itself—including, particularly, its owners—and the other parties with whom the firm 
contracts, such as creditors” and observing that “the difficulty lies in assuring that the firm, as agent, does not 
behave opportunistically”). 
 104 Cf. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
531, 535 (2002) (discussing the currently dominant representation of the corporation as a monolithic entity and 
suggesting that regulation should instead take into consideration the fact that corporations are not black boxes). 
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3. The Optimal Compensation Contract Approach 
The most recent corporate finance scholarship has taken a third path and 
reintroduced the shareholder–manager agency problem into the analysis of the 
governance of risk taking. As discussed above, complete alignment of 
shareholders and managers through equity compensation produces a negative 
externality for the debtholders: managers are transformed into risk-loving 
agents.105 In response, the contemporary financial paradigm suggests that 
managers should be given incentives to act as impartial agents of both the 
shareholders and the debtholders; to this end, a manager’s payoff schedule 
should be tied to both the firm’s equity and the firm’s debt.106 In other words, 
under this paradigm, the simultaneous governance problems that arise between 
a firm’s shareholders and managers, on the one hand, and a firm’s shareholders 
and debtholders, on the other, become an issue of optimal compensation 
design. 
4. Toward a More Comprehensive Approach 
This Article argues that each of these approaches to the governance of risk 
taking is lacking. Each of the three fails to fully consider that a firm’s internal 
governance is a function of the richer set of interactions between shareholders 
and debtholders, that is, external governance. 
First, policy analysis focuses exclusively on internal governance 
arrangements, conceived as a set of requirements imposed by law. But the law 
grants investors latitude to shape these arrangements. Legal guidance on 
governance arrangements often comes in the form of default rules, not iron 
rules.107 For example, each corporation must have a board of directors, but the 
 
 105 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 106 The pioneering studies on the use of executive compensation to solve the simultaneous agency 
problems of effort and risk are John & John, supra note 8, at 954–60, which provides a formal model of 
optimal compensation design and multiple agency problems, and John et al., supra note 9, at 99–121, which 
provides a formal model of optimal compensation design in the banking sector. For a more recent treatment of 
the same approach, see Bebchuck & Spamann, supra note 74, at 253, 283–84, which suggests tying bank 
executive compensation to a security basket representing “a set percentage of the aggregate value of common 
shares, preferred shares, and all outstanding bonds.” 
 107 See Acharya & Volpin, supra note 16, at 2 (“[R]ecent literature shows that individual companies can 
choose governance arrangements beyond what is required by law and regulation . . . .”); Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Exit, Voice, and Liability: Legal Dimensions of Organizational Structure 4 (June 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.isnie.org/paper/131.html (“[Legal organizational] forms 
typically afford[], to the parties forming them, a degree of variation . . . .”); see also Baber & Liang, supra note 
4, at 1–2 (“[M]anagers, informed by their understanding of firm-specific governance problems, chose among 
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expertise of board members and the number of meetings is left to the discretion 
of private actors. And even when internal governance requirements are 
formulated as mandatory, they may contain loopholes or receive only weak 
enforcement.108 Thus, by assuming that internal governance arrangements 
operate in a vacuum and omitting any discussion of external governance, the 
policy analysis approach is bound to provide an incomplete account of the 
crisis. 
In opposition to this approach, the optimal debt contract approach is 
indifferent to the internal governance arrangements that discipline the firm’s 
decision-making process. Indeed, this treatment assumes a context in which the 
constraints arising from the debt contract are sufficient to adequately control a 
firm’s risk choices. In reality, however, the debtholder–firm relationship 
involves changing conditions, contractual incompleteness,109 and managers 
who are imperfect shareholder agents.110 Contracts cannot predict every 
possible contingency. And managers running the corporate affairs may act in 
their own self-interest. The debt contract approach fails to account for these 
dynamics and their impact on a firm’s risk choices. 
Finally, the optimal compensation contract approach can be viewed as a 
partial explanation of the relationship between external and internal 
governance mechanisms. This approach reflects an understanding of the 
interaction existing between shareholder and debtholder governance, on the 
one hand, and a fundamental governance arrangement—manager 
compensation schemes—on the other. However, it reduces this interaction to a 
 
governance alternatives to construct governance systems. . . . [T]herefore, we observe inter-firm cross-
sectional differences in the portfolios of governance procedures and mechanisms that comprise corporate 
governance systems.”). The thesis of Baber and Liang that managers themselves shape a firm’s internal 
governance can be reconciled with this Article’s thesis about the governance role of shareholders and 
debtholders by observing that managers respond to the activism of these investors in choosing specific 
governance arrangements. 
 108 This is what happened, for example, with independency requirements established by the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303.A00 (2012), available at 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4&manual=%2Flcm%2Fse
ctions%2Flcm-sections%2F. Before the crisis a large majority of banks’ board members qualified as 
independent pursuant to these rules. See NESTOR REPORT, supra note 53, at 8. After the crisis, however, 
several commentators have expressed doubts about the material independence of board members. See MEHRAN 
ET AL., supra note 93, at 11–12 (2011) (“The challenge for supervisors is, irrespective of official 
independence . . . .”). 
 109 See generally Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473 (1992) (Swed.). 
 110 See supra text accompanying notes 49–51 (discussing several ways in which managers’ actions may 
depart from the pursuit of shareholders’ interests). 
SEPE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2013 9:57 AM 
2012] REGULATING RISK AND GOVERNANCE IN BANKS 359 
problem of optimal compensation design. Therefore, it fails to take into 
account issues of contractual incompleteness and, primarily, monitoring, which 
is, instead, an essential governance component. Conditions may change and 
compensation schemes may fail to provide managers with the right incentives 
to act as perfect agents, potentially demanding the undertaking of corrective 
action by the principals.111 And these incompleteness issues are likely to be 
compounded when managers are required to act simultaneously as common 
agents of both shareholders and debtholders.112 
The discussion that follows attempts to fully incorporate the interaction 
between external and internal governance mechanisms into the analysis of the 
effects of bank governance on risk taking. To this end, this discussion will use 
insights from contract theory to develop a counterfactual analysis of what bank 
governance would be absent safety nets. First, it will investigate the general 
dynamics of the interaction between external and internal governance in 
corporations. Second, it will apply the results of this investigation to 
corporations with high leverage, since banks fit into this paradigm. Finally, it 
will contrast these results with the reality of the distortions introduced in 
governance mechanisms by deposit insurance and other safety nets. 
B. Multi-Dimensional Moral Hazard and the Dynamics of Governance113 
On a general level, the governance activity of both shareholders and 
debtholders has two components—monitoring and the exercise of governance 
 
 111 See DEWATRIPONT & TIROLE, supra note 12, at 120 (suggesting that the limited verifiability of the 
manager’s actions makes the compensation contract insufficient to provide adequate disciplining incentives 
and requires the provision of additional incentives by means of the “external involvement” of the firm’s 
investors, i.e., both shareholders and debtholders). For a more detailed discussion of the limits of the optimal 
compensation approach to bank governance, see infra Part III.C.3. 
 112 In the economics of information, a common agency problem arises when a single agent performs tasks 
on behalf of multiple principals who have divergent preferences. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. 
Whinston, Common Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA 923, 923–24 (1986). Consistent with this paradigm, in the 
modern corporation managers act as both agent of the shareholders and the debtholders. On the one hand, 
managers exercise delegated authority over the enterprise on behalf of the shareholders. On the other hand, in 
this position, they execute the debtholders’ contract with the firm. In my prior work, I have investigated the 
applicability of the common agency model to the modern corporation at greater length, suggesting that this 
model provides a better descriptive and normative account of corporate agency problems than the traditional 
principal–agent paradigm. See Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 113, 124–33 (2010). 
 113 The term multi-dimensional moral hazard is used to refer to moral hazard that involves “effort choices 
and risk choices at the same time.” See Martin F. Hellwig, A Reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling Model of 
Outside Finance, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 495, 496 (2009) (introducing this concept of moral hazard); see 
also Biais & Casamatta, supra note 38, at 1293. 
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levers. Monitoring involves the collection and processing of both prospective 
(i.e., forward-looking) and retrospective (i.e., backward-looking) information 
about the firm.114 The exercise of governance levers consists of the actions 
investors take—based on the information they gather through their monitoring 
activity—to protect their investment expectations. Drawing on the insights of 
Albert Hirschman’s classic taxonomy of the relationships between individuals 
and organizations, these actions can be aggregated into two broad categories: 
exit and voice.115 Exit involves the termination of the investors’ participation 
in the corporation, while voice involves the exercise of control rights.116 
1. The Effort Dimension 
As residual corporate claimants, shareholders act simultaneously as the 
constituency that cares the most about managerial effort117 and that faces the 
most severe contracting challenges while protecting their investment 
expectations.118 Indeed, even complex sets of contractual rules cannot 
completely solve the informational asymmetry problems that shareholders bear 
while attempting to control daily management actions. Equity-based 
compensation is useful to mitigate shareholder–manager conflicts, but it faces 
similar limitations: it is an imperfect instrument to solve problems of 
contractual incompleteness. First, manager performance is difficult to verify, 
which may limit the effectiveness of incentive-based compensation.119 Second, 
while equity-based compensation deters shirking, it is less effective in 
 
 114 See TIROLE, supra note 49, at 334–35. 
 115 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3–4 (1970). 
 116 Id. at 30. Like in Hirschman’s work, in this Article the term voice is used not only to refer to formal 
powers of decision making, but also to any form of influence (including backroom influence and “jawboning” 
activities) that shareholders and debtholders may be able to exercise on corporate decisions. In contrast to 
Hirschman, however, this Article refers to transferability rights, such as sale of stock or other corporate 
securities, as a form of exit. Although the right to transfer one’s corporate participation to another does not 
exactly correspond to termination of participation in an organization, what matters for this Article is that 
transferability rights are a powerful means to influence corporate decisions. 
 117 However, it is important to emphasize that all the firm’s constituencies, including debtholders, benefit 
to some extent from increased managerial effort, because higher effort increases the likelihood of successful 
firm performance and the likelihood that the firm will be able to meet its debt obligations. See Triantis & 
Daniels, supra note 4, at 1078. From this perspective, this section extends the thesis of Triantis and Daniels 
that exit by a firm’s lenders provides valuable information for disciplining managers’ effort choices, arguing 
that the interaction between debtholder and shareholder governance produces beneficial effects along the 
dimension of managers’ risk choices as well. 
 118 See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the 
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25, 36 (1991). 
 119 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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constraining private benefits extraction. Indeed, the managers’ ability to extract 
private benefits typically matures over time. Therefore, this form of 
opportunism may be difficult to prevent through contract at the outset of the 
shareholder–manager relationship. Further, equity-based compensation may be 
of little help in constraining entrenchment. Managers’ first concern is 
preserving their power.120 Thus, the appeal of a better return on their equity 
stake may not be sufficient to prevent them from undertaking suboptimal 
projects that secure their control position. 
In response to these problems, corporate law provides shareholders with a 
variety of institutional means, including voting rights and fiduciary duties, to 
exercise influence (i.e., voice) over the corporate decision-making process.121 
In addition, public shareholders have the right to exit from the corporation by 
transferring (i.e., selling) their shares to other investors.122 Because share 
transfers can impose negative consequences on the corporation, shareholders 
can successfully interfere with governance arrangements with the mere threat 
of exit.123 Accordingly, the exercise of shareholder governance involves a fluid 
 
 120 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific 
Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 123–24 (1989) (suggesting that managers may invest in suboptimal projects 
that require their specific contribution in order to secure their control position). 
 121 Shareholders also have the power to remove the board, although commonly removal must be for cause. 
See Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 858 (Del. Ch. 1957) (establishing that a director may be removed 
for cause). In addition, under some statutes, they can directly intervene in the governance of the corporation 
through the amendment of corporate bylaws. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 211 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2006) (amended 2010); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 601(a) (McKinney 2003). Further, 
shareholder-initiated proposals are possible under Rule 14(a)-8 of federal proxy rules (i.e., the town meeting 
rule), which gives shareholders voice in several governance subjects, including executive compensation, board 
organizational rules, and anti-takeover measures. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-8 (2011). For a thorough 
discussion of shareholder voice, see Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic 
Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra 
note 103, at 55, 55–87. 
 122 See Armour et al., supra note 103, at 41 & n.26. While transferability of shareholder claims is not 
provided for in unlisted corporations, buyout agreements and withdrawal rights often grant shareholders of 
these corporations a contractual right of exit. See id. 
 123 Exit can have a negative impact on share prices, especially when it is exercised by large shareholders. 
To this extent, exit punishes managers as long as their compensation is equity-based. See Anat R. Admati & 
Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2645, 2646 (2009). More drastically, exit in the form of transfer rights “permits the replacement of the 
current shareholder/principal(s) by a new one that may be more effective in controlling the firm’s 
management.” See Armour et al., supra note 103, at 41. Hence, “a transfer of control rights, or even the threat 
of it, can be a highly effective device for disciplining management.” Id. 
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process where exit and voice act as complementary means of organizational 
discipline.124 
However, shareholders’ interest in profit maximization does not just 
involve inducing managers to exert effort. Instead, shareholders also want to 
minimize costs, including the cost of debt. Under this more complete 
representation of the shareholders’ optimization problem, shareholder 
governance emerges as a disciplining mechanism that naturally interacts with 
debtholder governance. 
2. The Risk Dimension 
In order to better understand the factors at play in the interaction between 
shareholder and debtholder governance, it is helpful to start with a simple 
observation. On the one hand, as residual claimants protected by limited 
liability, shareholders want high-risk, high-return projects;125 on the other 
hand, they want to minimize the cost of debt.126 Instead, debtholders, as fixed 
claimants, want low-risk projects that preserve asset value.127 These divergent 
risk preferences are managed through implicit negotiation between 
shareholders and debtholders. Accordingly, in a world of complete 
information, shareholders and debtholders would always be able to negotiate 
for complete contracts that eliminate inefficient risk taking. That is, 
debtholders would be able to demand interest rates that are fully contingent on 
the actions taken by the firm.128 
The following variation of the above example on excessive risk taking will 
better illustrate the point.129 Bank Alpha may still have the opportunity to 
substitute   	    for   	 . Under the original setting of the example, 
the undertaking of   	    will penalize the debtholders if the interest rate 
( ) they bargain for is based on the assumption that Bank Alpha will undertake 
  	 : i.e., 90%[$90	(1+  )] = $90, from which   = (1 90%⁄ )− 1 =
11.11%. But in a world of symmetric information, the debtholders would 
 
 124 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 107, at 3 (arguing that exit, voice, and liability are 
complementary organizational means, rather than alternative means as suggested by Hirschman). 
 125 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 126 See John & John, supra note 8, at 951. 
 127 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 128 See Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW 277, 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (“A complete contract prescribes payoff-relevant actions for 
every possible state of the world and the payoffs for these actions.”).  
 129 See supra Part I.A.1. 
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anticipate that the manager could use the proceeds from debt to substitute 
  	    for   	 . And they would also observe which project Bank 
Alpha undertakes afterward. Accordingly, as shown in Figure 4 below, they 
would be able to write a contingent contract under which the interest rate 
applicable to   	    is: 55%[$90	(1+  )] = $90, from which   =
(1 55%⁄ )− 1 = 81.82%.130 This higher interest rate would compensate the 
debtholders for the wealth expropriation they bear under Project III. As a 
result, the substitution of Project III for Project I would no longer be profitable 
for the shareholders. Indeed, the higher gains they would receive from Project 
III would be offset by the increase in the cost of debt: i.e., 55%[$180−
$90	(1+ 81.82%)] = $9 < 90%[$120− $90	(1+ 11.11%)] = $18.131 
 
 
 130 This result can be generalized by distinguishing two cases. See supra note 38 (providing a description 
of the basic setting of the model that is used to generalize the examples in the text). Consider first the case 
where the principal and the interest portion to be repaid to the debtholders at    are lower than the return of the 
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Note that the interest rate is increasing in      . Indeed, since in this case the debtholders are paid in full upon 
realization of the medium state, they are more concerned with a reduction in the probability of realization of 
the middle state (i.e.,      +     ) than they are interested in a marginal increase in the probability of the high 
state (i.e.,     ). Consider now the case where the principal and the interest portion to be repaid to the 
debtholders at    are, instead, higher than the return of the middle state, i.e.,   1+  
     >  . Here, the 
condition that determines the equilibrium interest rate is   
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+  
















         holds. Also here 
the interest rate is increasing in      . However, in this case the debtholders bear losses both under the medium 
state and the low state. That is, they are are repaid in full only upon realization of the high state. Therefore, the 
interest rate is decreasing in     . 
 131 In both the cases identified supra in note 130, under       the undertaking of  	    becomes 
unprofitable for the shareholders since        −  −       −   1+        < 0. 
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In reality, however, the scarcity of observable and verifiable information 
leaves debtholders incapable of bargaining for contingent interest rates. As a 
result, in order to protect their investment expectations, debtholders price debt 
through a pooling mechanism: they pool firms in risk categories and price debt 
based on the average risk of each category.132 The pooling mechanism of debt 
pricing, however, leads to an inefficient allocation of debt capital. For low 
levels of adverse selection, it may produce cross-subsidization effects, 
increasing the likelihood that projects like Project III are funded in place of 
more efficient projects like Project I.133 More radically, for high levels of 
adverse selection (i.e., when in the market there are many projects like Project 
III), it may lead to credit rationing because debtholders are aware that the 
demand for higher returns is not a perfect compensatory mechanism.134 In the 
context of our example, these adverse effects imply that Bank Alpha’s 
shareholders may either face a higher cost of debt or be unable to raise the 
capital needed to finance Project I (recall that Project I is Bank Alpha’s 
available project at the issuance of debt, while Project III only is a future 
possibility).135 Explained simply, the pooling mechanism of debt pricing 
reduces expected equity returns. This serves to produce a disciplinary effect: in 
order to minimize their cost of debt, shareholders have incentives to send a 
signal to the debtholders that they can credibly commit their firm to sound risk 
policies.136 Debtholders, in turn, incorporate credible signals into the cost of 
debt, moving from a pooling to a separating equilibrium.137 
 
 132 See Charles B. Cadsby et al., Pooling, Separating, and Semiseparating Equilibria in Financial 
Markets: Some Experimental Evidence, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 315, 318 (1990) (“Consider a situation in which a 
firm’s management has better information than do potential investors concerning . . . the value of the firm’s 
assets . . . . Investors take into account the presence of less valuable firms in the market when deciding how 
much to offer for newly issued securities.”). See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing the concept of pooling 
equilibrium). 
 133 Cross-subsidization is the problem that arises when good firms (i.e., firms that undertake projects like 
 	 ) receive worse terms (i.e., higher interest rates) from the market than they would if their nature were 
known; whereas bad firms (i.e., firms that undertake projects like  	   ) receive far better terms. See 
TIROLE, supra note 49, at 252. 
 134 Credit rationing describes a market condition where creditors offer less aggregate credit, with the 
consequence that good business projects might risk going unfunded. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz & 
Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981) 
(modeling credit rationing in loan market equilibrium). 
 135 See supra text accompanying notes 36–38. 
 136 In economics of information, signaling is used in the context of asymmetric information when the 
agent has private information that she wants to reveal to the principal in order to obtain better contractual 
terms. See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973) (defining and 
examining the characteristics of market signaling). Since a credible signal is always costly to the agent, it 
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Consistent with the common law view of the debt contract as the essential 
source of debtholder governance,138 the negotiation of contractual covenants 
giving debtholders authority to condition the firm’s decisions is the standard 
form the shareholders’ commitment to sound risk policies takes. Among the 
several types of contractual covenants that allow debtholders to condition their 
debtors’ decisions,139 there are (i) informational covenants that facilitate 
monitoring, (ii) investment restrictions that constrain the firm’s discretion over 
investment policies (often in the form of veto powers), and (iii) financial 
covenants that provide for minimum financial goals that the debtor is 
continually required to meet.140 In addition to control covenants, all debt 
contracts typically provide for exit in the form of a right of withdrawal upon 
bargained-for trigger events.141 The threat of exercising this right offers a 
powerful governance lever to debtholders, allowing them to dynamically react 
to unforeseen contingencies. This happens because withdrawal can trigger 
insolvency if the corporation is not liquid enough to pay back its debts or is 
unable to refinance. In this respect, the debt contract only represents the 
reference point in the exercise of active control by debtholders, with the threat 
 
implements what in agency theory is termed a bonding mechanism: i.e., a mechanism that protects the 
principal by imposing penalties on the agent for a shortfall in performance. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 
7, at 308. 
 137 See generally Jeffrey S. Banks & Joel Sobel, Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games, 55 
ECONOMETRICA 647 (1987). 
 138 See, e.g., Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 787 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“It is 
presumed that creditors are capable of protecting themselves through the contractual agreements that govern 
their relationships with firms.”). There are, however, some laws that are designed to protect creditors’ interests 
under specific circumstances, including federal securities laws that impose mandatory disclosure duties on the 
debtor, rules on capital regulation, fraudulent conveyance law, and the equitable powers of “piercing the 
corporate veil.” See generally ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 2.4, at 71–74 (1986). From a 
contractarian perspective, this minimum set of “creditor-protecting rules” can be seen as a mandatory contract 
that binds parties even when they have not bargained for such protections. See id. § 2.1, at 37. 
 139 It is important to emphasize here that while this Article examines banks as debtors, the general theory 
of debtholder governance is based on the benchmark of banks’ conduct as creditors of non-banking firms. See 
Triantis & Daniels, supra note 4, at 1080–81; Tung, supra note 4, at 125–26. More recent economic studies, 
however, have suggested that bondholders also engage in active governance, mostly by bargaining for risk-
event covenants. See K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices, 20 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1359, 1362 (2007). 
 140 See Tung, supra note 4, at 135–40 (providing a detailed description of the various types of debt 
covenants); see also Smith & Warner, supra note 35, at 125–46 (examining the ways in which bond covenants 
are written to control conflicts between stockholders and debtholders). 
 141 See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 4, at 1084 (describing the several forms that exit in the form of a 
right of withdrawal can take). 
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of exit forcing renegotiation and allowing debtholders to “complete” the 
contract over time.142 
So far the discussion of the governance dynamics that address risk choices 
within corporations has assumed away the role of the managers. In reality, 
however, unless the corporation is controlled by a blockholder, it is the 
managers that run the negotiation with the debtholders on the shareholders’ 
behalf. To this extent, self-interested managerial behavior also matters for the 
governance of risk choices, demanding shareholder control of such choices. 
This is because a manager’s compensation contract may fail to perfectly align 
her risk preferences with those of the shareholders, even when the manager is 
compensated through equity-based schemes.143 Thus, the manager may have 
private incentives to undertake riskier projects that offer her a remunerative 
private benefit even when these projects are unprofitable for the 
shareholders.144 Moreover, equity-based compensation might present 
additional problems with respect to optimal risk choices. At the time they are 
granted, stock options add an additional layer of leverage in the managers’ 
payoff schedules that serves to align the managers’ risk preferences with those 
of the shareholders.145 But if a riskier project materializes after a grant of the 
stock options, the wedge created by this additional leverage might make such a 
project profitable for the manager even when its undertaking is inefficient from 
the shareholders’ viewpoint.146 
 
 142 Debt covenants are often designed to trigger further governance actions upon violation. A typical 
scenario might feature debtholders threatening to exit unless they receive monetary concessions. Thus, 
renegotiation is often an agreed upon and standard feature of debt agreements. See Greg Nini et al., Creditor 
Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713, 1720 (2012); see also 
Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit 
Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159, 160 (2009) (reporting that more than 90% of private debt with stated 
maturity exceeding one year is renegotiated). 
 143 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 144 See George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for 
Profit, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, 1993, at 1, 10 (observing that bank managers may 
invest in projects so risky as to be sure failures as long as they can divert money for personal use through these 
projects). 
 145 See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 74, at 264. 
 146 Thus, in the example in Part I.A.2 it might be initially optimal for Bank Alpha’s shareholders to 
compensate the manager with a stock option plan where the wedge of the manager’s additional leverage is 
given by $  > 2.26 (where $  is the strike price of the manager’s call option). Indeed, setting $  at a high 
value induces the manager to undertake  	   , but limits the positional rents the manager can extract. 
Positional rents are returns above the manager’s agency rent, which is “the minimum expected monetary 
payoff to be left to the [agents] to preserve incentives.” See TIROLE, supra note 49, at 117. However, if a 
project riskier than  	    materializes ex post, a high $  can make the riskier project profitable for the 
manager, while the same project could be unprofitable for the shareholders. 
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C. Governance with High Leverage 
Examining the factors generally at play in the governance of corporations 
sets the stage for discussing the case of high-leveraged corporations.147 In 
particular, the discussion that follows will consider the specific sub-case where 
debtholders of high-leveraged corporations bargain for rapid exit from the 
original contract. These exit rights can take several forms: for example, rights 
of withdrawal, acceleration, or conversion.148 This paradigm fits the case of 
banks, since their business model employs high leverage and most bank 
debtholders can exercise a right of withdrawal at will.149 
With high leverage and rapid exit rights, the debtholders can promptly gain 
corporate control by triggering insolvency or converting their investment if 
dissatisfied with firm performance. As a result, the threat of exit grants 
debtholders an extremely powerful governance lever to “manage” unforeseen 
contingencies. Anticipating the severe consequences that might follow from 
the exercise of this right, shareholders will have stronger incentives to 
distinguish their firms as safe investments. This leads to a theory of efficient 
shareholder signaling in high-leveraged firms, which serves as the 
counterfactual conditional for banks’ governance dynamics without insurance. 
A variation of this Article’s running example on excessive risk taking will 
illustrate this theory. 
1. Signaling with High Leverage 
Suppose again that, after the issuance of debt, Bank Alpha’s manager may 
have the opportunity to substitute   	    for   	 . In this case, 
however, the debtholders anticipate that Bank Alpha, i.e., the manager, may 
switch to a riskier project before the debt becomes due and, therefore, engage 
in monitoring. Assume that, for the debtholders, monitoring has an expected 
cost of $3.6, which they pass on to Bank Alpha in pricing debt. Thus, the 
initial equilibrium interest rate ( ) of the debt contract is determined by the 
 
 147 See supra note 13 (explaining this Article’s specific use of the term high-leveraged corporations). 
 148 Conversion rights allow investors to both withdraw the value of an investment they have made and 
simultaneously reinvest this value in another investment. Convertible bonds, a classic example, allow 
convertible bondholders to turn a debt participation into an equity participation. Puttable stock provides an 
additional example. This hybrid financial instrument gives the holder the right to put stock back to the issuing 
corporation for a predetermined price, to be corresponded either in cash or through (newly issued) common 
stock. See Sepe, supra note 112, at 151–55 (examining the governance implication of securities providing for 
conversion and redemption rights). 
 149 See supra text accompanying notes 29–32. 
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following equation: 90%[$90(1+  )]− $3.6 = $90, from	which	  = (1 ⁄
(90%))− 1+ ($3.6 ⁄ $90) = 14%.
150 
Suppose now that, after signing, the debtholders discover through their 
monitoring that   	    may become available to Bank Alpha. The 
debtholders also infer, but do not get additional information about, the 
probability that Bank Alpha will switch from   	  to	  	   . For 
example, suppose that the debtholders expect Bank Alpha to undertake 
  	  with probability 3 4⁄  and   	   	with probability 1 4⁄ . Further 
suppose that, given this expectation, the debtholders threaten to withdraw their 
investment if Bank Alpha does not increase the interest rate to the level where 
the breakeven condition is satisfied:   = (3 4⁄ )14%+ (1 4⁄ )81.82% =
30.1%. 151 Note that the increase in the interest rate demanded by the 
debtholders is the result of a pooling equilibrium since the debtholders have no 
certainty as to whether Bank Alpha’s manager will switch ex post to 
  	   , but only a positive inference of this probability.152 
The pooling interest rate compensates the debtholders ex ante for the risk 
that the manager may substitute   	    for   	 . However, if 
  	    ultimately fails to materialize, this interest rate will increase the 
agency cost of debt borne by Bank Alpha’s shareholders. Indeed, the 
shareholders’ expected returns under the initial interest rate of 14% are equal 
to 90%[$120− $90(1+ 14%)] = $15.66. Instead, under the pooling interest 
rate of 30.1%, the shareholders’ expected returns are reduced to: 90%[$120−
$90(1+ 30.1%)] = $2.62. Thus, in order to pay a lower interest rate, the 
shareholders will have incentives to send a signal to the debtholders that they 
can credibly commit Bank Alpha, i.e., the manager, to the undertaking of 
  	 .153 As long as the shareholders can credibly commit to   	  
 
 150 Assuming that monitoring has a cost   for the debtholders, the initial equilibrium interest rate is 
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 151 The breakeven condition is the condition that satisfies the debtholders’ participation constraint. See 
supra text accompanying note 37 (defining participation constraint). 
 152 Formally, the debtholders only know the distribution of banks that will switch to  	   . Such 




    . Hence, the debtholders demand a pooling interest rate 






 153 A credible signal is one that can change the debtholders’ belief. Let us consider the case where the 
shareholders can credibly signal to the debtholders that Bank Alpha will not substitute  	  with 
 	    at the convex cost     , where   ∈   ,    is the level of effort exerted by the shareholders to signal 
Bank Alpha’s type. Using standard assumptions, when   =   the signal is uninformative and      = 0. 
Instead, when   =  , the signal is fully informative and      = ∞. The signal has the effect of changing the 
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with probability 1, the equilibrium interest rate will go back to the initial rate 
of 14%. This implies that signaling will always be efficient for the 
shareholders as long as its cost is lower than the net gains the shareholders 
obtain under the lower interest rate. Thus, the cost of signaling for the 
shareholders must be lower than $15.66− $2.62 = $13.04.154 
Which form will the shareholders’ signal take in a highly leveraged 
corporation like Bank Alpha? As discussed above, the negotiation of control 
covenants is the standard signal that firms employ to reduce the costs of debt 
pricing.155 Covenants, however, are costly: they may burden firms with high 
opportunity costs156 and they may burden debtholders with high monitoring 
costs.157 Thus, the posting of costly collateral is an additional signal that firms 
use to contain increases in interest rates, while simultaneously reducing the 
costs of covenants. On the other hand, there are circumstances in which the 
nature of the debtor’s assets may make collateralization an inadequate 
instrument to protect the debtholders’ interests.158 This is especially likely in 
the banking sector, where assets are highly fungible, because this feature 
 
prior belief of the debtholders in the sense of shifting some mass of the distribution    ,    to the left. Then 
   ,  
 
< 0. Therefore, as long as Bank Alpha is undertaking  	 	and assuming, without loss of 


























 154 Two considerations are worth exploring here. First, under the original assumptions of the example, the 
compensation contract of Bank Alpha’s manager perfectly aligns her preferences with the preferences of the 
shareholders. See supra Part I.A.2. But in reality, Bank Alpha’s manager may have private reasons to continue 
to prefer  	    even under the pooling interest rate. See supra text accompanying notes 143–46. Hence, 
the shareholders need to monitor the manager’s activity in the negotiation with the debtholders. Second, note 
that because bank assets create a high level of adverse selection, even a single agent’s attempt to distinguish 
herself would be enough for the principal to conclude that the remaining, non-signaling agents are bad. Thus, 
if Bank Alpha failed to separate, the debtholders would infer that the manager will undertake  	    with 
probability 1. Therefore, they would demand an interest rate of 81.82%, jeopardizing the conclusion of the 
debt contract. Under this scenario, sending a signal to the debtholders might thus be the only supportable 
equilibrium for the shareholders to raise debt financing. 
 155 See supra text accompanying notes 138–40. 
 156 See, e.g., Sepe, supra note 112, at 145–46 (explaining that the rigid structure of debt covenants may 
deprive firms of the flexibility needed to pursue profitable investment opportunities). 
 157 See, e.g., Squire, supra note 11, at 1153, 1162 (observing that covenants need monitoring to be 
effective and, therefore, may be costly). 
 158 See TIROLE, supra note 49, at 167. In addition, deadweight losses may be attached to collateralization, 
including ex ante and ex post transaction costs, the presence of ownership benefits not enjoyed by third parties, 
the suboptimal maintenance of the pledged asset by the debtor, and high opportunity costs upon financial 
distress of the debtor. See id. 
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makes it easier to “hide” increased risk taking.159 The venture capital context is 
another example where collateralization has limited signal value because start-
ups depend almost solely on intangible assets like human capital. 
Thus, control covenants and collateralization alone might fail to provide 
credible signals to the debtholders, especially when a firm’s capital structure is 
highly leveraged. In these circumstances, shareholders will need a “validating 
signal”: a signal that can corroborate other signals, which would be useless by 
themselves to differentiate the shareholders’ firm from other firms (i.e., move 
the mechanism of debt pricing to a separating equilibrium).160 To concretize 
this idea, consider again the case of venture capital. Two features make venture 
capital a clear context where the shareholders (i.e., the venture’s founders) 
need to send a validating signal to their financiers (i.e., the venture capitalists). 
The first is the inherent limit of collateralization in start-up firms. The second 
is the high non-common equity financing employed by these firms.161 
Observation from the practice suggests that these firms adopt special 
governance arrangements as a validating signal. Compared to other 
corporations of similar size, start-ups’ boards have fewer executive directors 
 
 159 See Levine, supra note 93, at 2–3 (pointing out that banks, unlike other types of firms, can quickly 
alter the composition, and, therefore, the risk, of their assets). Moreover, financial innovation and the 
development of risk-distribution technologies have hugely increased the ability of banks to “play” with their 
assets so as to hide actual risk exposures. Cf. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 293, 295–96 (2012) (arguing that the opacity of financial institutions was one of the crucial problems of 
the recent crisis). 
 160 See Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 
BELL J. ECON. 23, 27 (1977) (suggesting that in adverse selection contexts manager liability might be “a means 
of validating financial signals” which would otherwise be useless to achieve separation). In different 
contractual contexts, scholars have discussed the benefits of liquidated damage clauses and private antifraud 
rules as validating signals. See Robert Forsythe et al., Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in Financial 
Markets: Some Experimental Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 481, 487 (1999) (arguing that an antifraud rule 
punishing sellers who make false statements as to the quality of their products constitutes a way to give the 
“seller a means to credibly communicate its quality”); Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated Damage 
Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 582 (1992) (Eng.) 
(arguing that liquidated damage clauses may be used to communicate valuable information and move from a 
pooling to a separating equilibrium). 
 161 Venture capitalists’ claims are most commonly structured as preferred shares. See George G. Triantis, 
Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 312 (2001) (book 
review). However, as observed by Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen, “[w]hether the venture capitalist 
formally fits into the pigeonhole of ‘creditor’ or ‘shareholder’ is something she cares about only if something 
turns on it.” Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1217. Baird and Rasmussen also observed that in Sweden, 
where venture capitalists do not have the bankruptcy-related concerns of their U.S. counterparts, venture 
financing often takes the form of debt. See id. at 1217–18. 
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and more independent directors.162 It is also common practice for the venture 
capitalists to personally choose the venture’s independent directors (with the 
acquiescence of the firm’s founders) and appoint individuals with whom they 
have strong personal and professional ties.163 Even more importantly, empirical 
evidence shows that start-ups’ independent directors play a causal role in the 
firms’ decision-making processes, acting as a “counterweight to CEO 
control.”164 This feature of start-ups’ boards is similar to another example of a 
validating signal: the “use” by private debt borrowers of a bank’s 
representative on the board of directors.165 In addition to enabling superior 
monitoring by the firm’s lenders, affiliated bankers on a board can exert 
increased control over the borrower’s decision making.166 Thus, similar to the 
venture capital context, in private debt, firms employ special governance 
arrangements to mitigate the potential conflict with their financiers and 
minimize the cost of debt.167 
 
 162 See Malcolm Baker & Paul A. Gompers, The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public 
Offering, 46 J.L. & ECON. 569, 570–71 (2003) (gathering data from 1,116 IPO prospectuses and finding that 
“venture capitalists institute better internal governance mechanisms”). 
 163 See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 967, 971, 988 (2006) (observing that start-ups have unique governance structures). 
 164 See Baker & Gompers, supra note 162, at 593 (“Venture capitalists appear to be a counterweight to 
CEO control. Not only do venture capitalists reduce inside representation indirectly by reducing the control of 
the CEO with their concentrated outside ownership stakes, but reputable venture firms are also directly 
associated with greater outsider representation on the board.”). 
 165 See Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, 
and Lender Liability, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 415 (2001). Kroszner and Strahan report that almost a third of large U.S. 
firms have bankers on board. Id. at 416; see also João A.C. Santos & Adrienne S. Rumble, The American 
Keiretsu and Universal Banks: Investing, Voting and Sitting on Nonfinancials’ Corporate Boards, 80 J. FIN. 
ECON. 419, 437 (2006) (finding similarly that about 25% of non-financial S&P 500 firms have a banker on 
their board of directors). 
 166 See Kroszner & Strahan, supra note 165, at 419 (suggesting that the presence of bank representatives 
among outside board members reduces information asymmetry between the bank and the debtor); David 
Erkens et al., Affiliated Bankers on Board and Conservative Accounting 7 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.bus.miami.edu/_assets/files/faculty-and-research/conferences-and-
seminars/finance-seminars/Subramanyam%20-%20Paper.pdf (“Lender representation on the board increases 
the scope and dynamics of the firms’ relationship[s] with their lenders by allowing better monitoring and 
increased control from the affiliated bank.”). 
 167 This view is supported by empirical evidence about the positive correlation between the lower costs of 
debt capital and key governance features, such as the presence of a banker on board and independent directors 
on boards or accounting committees. See Ronald C. Anderson et al., Board Characteristics, Accounting Report 
Integrity, and the Cost of Debt, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 332–33 (2004) (finding that yield spreads decrease 
with higher numbers of independent directors on a firm’s board and fully independent audit committees); 
Daniel T. Byrd & Mark S. Mizruchi, Bankers on the Board and the Debt Ratio of Firms, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 129, 
132 (2005) (finding association between bankers on board and lower cost of debt). 
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Because of banks’ high-leveraged capital structures and the opacity of bank 
assets, governance theory predicts that bank shareholders would also need to 
employ a validating signal in negotiating with the debtholders. Drawing on the 
insights offered by the venture capital and private debt contexts, the next 
section discusses which form this signal could take. 
2. Advocacy 
Firms in the venture capital and private debt contexts employ special 
governance arrangements to make their commitments to sound risk policies 
credible to debtholders.168 These special governance arrangements share a 
common feature. They both depart from models with dominant CEOs, whose 
risk preferences are aligned with those of shareholders through equity-based 
compensation plans.169 Under those models, CEOs control the corporate 
decision-making process, that is, the flow of information from lower corporate 
layers to the board of directors. Indeed, the board’s role is to aggregate 
information from lower layers and produce decisional outcomes. Risk-liking 
CEOs occupy the highest position of the information hierarchy, often sitting on 
the board—a circumstance that enables them to exercise large control over the 
information aggregation process and the firm’s decisional outcomes.170 
In contrast to this CEO-centric model, the governance arrangements of 
start-up firms and many private debt borrowers provide for debtholders to 
make some board appointments.171 The rationale for this alternative structure is 
that placing individuals with divergent risk preferences in top positions of the 
firm’s information hierarchy fosters contrarian thinking and, therefore, less 
biased decision making. Research from information theory teaches that 
individuals acquire and pass along information based on their preferences.172 
Combining the disparate risk preferences of CEOs and debtholders’ appointees 
 
 168 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 169 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 170 See, e.g., NESTOR REPORT, supra note 53, at 4–5. The Nestor Report observed that the CEO also 
occupied the position of board chairman at all major U.S. investment banks before the crisis, with the CEO of 
Lehman Brothers having held his double appointment for eighteen years (from 1990 until the firm’s 
bankruptcy in 2008). See id. at 4. 
 171 See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text. 
 172 Augustin Landier et al., Optimal Dissent in Organizations, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 761, 769–73, 775 
(2009) (Swed.) (providing a formal model that conceptualizes the value of dissent and preference heterogeneity 
in organizational models and information production). For a description of the interdependence between 
decision rights and information structures, see Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in 
Organizations, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1997). 
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thus results in a process of information aggregation that may only return 
heterogeneous information.173 As a result, directors informed by antagonists 
will have a broader evidentiary base underlying their decisions. In opposition, 
a CEO-centric model may only present the board with biased information that 
favors risk taking. 
Organizational theorists and information economists define similar 
decisional models as advocacy systems.174 The distinguishing feature of such 
systems is to provide for a decision-making structure that combines an 
independent decision maker with the competing interaction of individuals who 
are appointed to be advocates of specific causes.175 For example, most 
judiciary systems are built on the idea that judges, as impartial decision 
makers, benefit from the partiality of the defense attorney and the prosecutor 
who stand in front of them to respectively defend and argue against the 
defendant’s reasons.176 An additional example comes from regulatory hearings 
in which lobbyists advance their own causes and proxy advocates (e.g., the 
state attorney general and consumer counsels for consumers) defend the 
interests of comparatively disorganized groups of individuals.177 Economists 
have re-conceptualized the benefits of these and other advocacy structures by 
suggesting that the exploitation of rivalry between advocates improves 
 
 173 See Landier et al., supra note 172, at 762 (arguing that “dissent fosters the use of objective information 
in decision making . . . . as it allows individual biases to ‘cancel each other out’”). 
 174 The seminal economic contribution on the informational and organizational value of advocacy systems 
is due to Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole. See Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, Advocates, 107 J. POL. 
ECON. 1 (1999) (providing a formal discussion about the use of such systems in various organizational 
contexts); see also Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND 
J. ECON. 18 (1986) (providing a seminal model on decisional mechanisms relying on information provided by 
interested parties); Hyun Song Shin, Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration, 29 RAND J. 
ECON. 378, 378–80 (1998) (showing that decisional procedures in which “the opposing parties are invited to 
make their cases” are superior to procedures in which the arbitrator adjudicates “on the basis of the 
information [he] uncovered” because the former procedures “allocate the burden of proof in an effective 
manner, thereby extracting the maximal informational content”). 
 175 See Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 174, at 2. 
 176 In the words of Justice Scalia, what defines the adversarial system of justice is “the presence of a judge 
who does not . . . conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts 
and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991). The 
American Bar Association’s defense of the adversarial system also provides a suggestive representation of the 
inherent merits of advocacy in decision making. See Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint 
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958) (“[A]ny arbiter who attempts to decide a dispute without the aid 
of partisan advocacy. . . . must undertake, not only the role of judge, but that of representative for both of the 
litigants. Each of these roles must be played to the full without being muted by qualifications derived from the 
others. . . . If it is true that a man in his time must play many parts, it is scarcely given to him to play them all 
at once.”). 
 177 See Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 174, at 2–3; see also Shin, supra note 174, at 378. 
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decision-making processes by leading to broader information production and 
constraining bias. 
This analysis suggests the existence of a “sound argument,” i.e., a logical 
argument following from true premises: in an ideal contracting world, bank 
shareholders, who want to send a validating signal to their debtholders, would 
employ advocacy-based governance arrangements. These arrangements would 
be perceived as safer by debtholders and, therefore, minimize the costs of debt. 
In a stylized representation, these safe governance arrangements would have 
two defining features. The first is the appointment of a representative of the 
debtholders’ interest within the bank. This debtholders’ advocate would 
operate as a counterweight to the CEO, who, in response to the use of equity-
based compensation, would serve as an advocate for risk-liking bank 
shareholders. Such an organizational model would not necessarily command 
the appointment of a debtholders’ fiduciary to the bank’s board. Instead, a 
similar result could be replicated by appointing an insider whose payoff 
structure is selected to align her risk preferences with the debtholders’ 
preferences. Consistent with recent international banking recommendations 
that stress the importance of the chief risk officer (CRO) in ensuring effective 
bank risk management,178 the CRO would be a natural candidate for the role of 
debtholders’ advocate. In practice, this would require compensating the CRO 
with a payoff schedule that decreases with the level of the bank’s risk taking, 
i.e., a concave payoff schedule.179 
The second defining feature of an advocacy system in banks would be a 
fully independent board of directors. This would guarantee the impartiality of 
the board as adjudicator of the competing panel of risk information provided 
by the CEO and the CRO. Given the natural risk aversion of individuals within 
corporations,180 the possibility that board members would exclude the CRO’s 
 
 178 See BASEL PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNANCE, supra note 20. Among other issues, in the new Principles 
for Enhancing Corporate Governance, enacted in 2010, the Basel Committee recommended that the CRO 
should (i) “[be] an independent senior executive with distinct responsibility for the risk management function”; 
(ii) “not have any management or financial responsibility in respect of any operational business lines or 
revenue-generating functions”; and (iii) “have sufficient stature, authority and seniority within the 
organisation.” See id. at 17–18. 
 179 This means that the payoff schedule of the CRO should echo the concave payoff schedule of 
debtholders. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 180 Because of the specific investments they make, individuals within a corporation—including board 
members—tend to be risk averse in the absence of contractual mechanisms that induce different risk 
preferences. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing managers’ intrinsic risk aversion). 
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evidence in aggregating risk information is negligible.181 Additionally, in an 
advocacy system, “there is always someone to blow the whistle on an abusive 
decision maker.”182 This is because in this system each advocate has the right 
incentive to raise her voice if she believes that the board has been corrupted 
and unduly favored her opponent to the detriment of sound decision making. 
D. Governance and Insurance 
The above analysis has explained that in an undistorted world, debt 
discipline would induce bank shareholders to actively seek safe governance 
arrangements, e.g., advocacy models. The ensuing discussion explains why, in 
the real world, safety nets—deposit insurance and bailouts—give rise to the 
adoption of governance arrangements that promote rather than constrain risk 
taking. 
1. Moral Hazard of Bank Debtholders 
Federal deposit insurance—which guarantees qualified bank deposits in the 
event of bank failure—is justified by the need to protect depositors and the 
desire to avoid destabilizing bank runs.183 An analogous rationale justifies 
bailout interventions, which provide several forms of government-funded 
financial support to failing banks. Indeed, given the interconnectedness of the 
banking sector, the need to maintain financial stability might arise 
independently from the protection of depositors’ interests at individual banks. 
In modern banking, this risk has been compounded by banks’ increasing 
exposure to short-term (and therefore run-prone) liabilities. As the 2007–2008 
 
 181 To this extent, the organizational features defining the board of directors under the advocacy system 
envisioned by this Article resemble the “mediating hierarchy” model of the board articulated by Margaret Blair 
and Lynn Stout in their influential 1999 paper on team production in corporations. See Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 254 (1999) (suggesting that 
“directors should not be under direct control of either shareholders or other stakeholders”). However, Blair and 
Stout viewed the inclusion of creditors among the corporation’s factors of production (i.e., team members) as 
just “possible.” Id. at 253 (“[B]oards exist . . . to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members 
of the corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other groups, 
such as creditors.”). But banks’ primary function is to produce liquidity. Hence, in these organizations, 
creditors—together with shareholders—are a vital factor of production and, therefore, an essential, rather than 
possible, governance component. 
 182 See Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 174, at 6. 
 183 Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz famously noted that deposit insurance “has succeeded 
in achieving what had been a major objective of banking reform for at least a century, namely, the prevention 
of banking panics.” MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1867–1960, at 440 (1963). 
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crisis demonstrated, in this highly leveraged environment runs are no longer 
undertaken only by depositors, but are also initiated by large, sophisticated 
debtholders (i.e., interbank creditors).184 Short-term debtholders, no matter 
how sophisticated, choose to run if they expect trouble.185 
But while safety nets protect the integrity of the banking infrastructure 
against runs, they also create a problem of their own. Shifting the cost of 
potential bank losses on to taxpayers, these measures make debt capital less 
expensive for bank shareholders. That is, shareholders’ profit maximization 
expectations become virtually unconstrained with explicit or implicit 
governmental insurance of debtholders’ claims.186 As a result, shareholders no 
longer have incentives to distinguish their banks as sound by actively seeking 
to implement safe governance arrangements. 
A variation of the above example on signaling can better illustrate these 
dynamics. Imagine that Bank Alpha can be bailed out with probability 85%. 
This means that in the event of default, the debtholders of Bank Alpha will 
receive the face value of debt with probability 85%, almost as if they had 
privately insured their credit.187 Thus, when Bank Alpha raises debt of $90 to 
invest in    	 , the equilibrium interest rate ( ) will be determined by 
90%[$90(1+  )]+ 10%(85%)[$90(1+  )]− $3.6 = $90, from which 
  = 5.5%188 < 14%. (Recall that 14% is the interest rate the debtholders 
would apply for   	  absent insurance and $3.6 is the cost the 
debtholders bear for monitoring.)189 This shows that the cost of debt decreases 
when the debtholders are insured, which, in turn, shifts a cost equal to 
 
 184 The events that took place in the repo market during the crisis provide a vivid example of how bank 
runs have expanded into other categories of bank debtholders. See supra text accompanying notes 86–91 
(discussing the implications of the increased use of repos and other short-term liabilities by modern banks). 
 185 See MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT ET AL., BALANCING THE BANKS: GLOBAL LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 4–5 (2010). 
 186 When insurance is implicit (i.e., not expressly provided for ex ante, as in the case of deposit 
insurance), bank debtholders are willing to accept lower interest rates for two reasons. First, they may expect 
to directly benefit from future rescue intervention by the government. This explains why this distorted set of 
incentives tends to be more severe in too-big-to-fail financial institutions. See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 
2, at 1371. Second, debtholders indirectly benefit from both explicit and implicit government guarantees that 
are granted to depositors and fellow debtholders because these guarantees reduce the risk of bank failure. See 
SQUAM LAKE REPORT, supra note 66, at 21. 
 187 This can be modeled by observing that in event of default of Bank Alpha the debtholders will be paid 
back with some probability   ∈  0,1 . 













     −   +    /      
 
      , where     <     . 
 189 See supra Part II.C.1. 
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10%(85%)[$90(1+ 5.5%)] = $8.07 onto the government (i.e., 
taxpayers).190 Importantly, this cost increases with the risk of the project. 
Indeed, with insurance, the interest rate applicable to   	    becomes: 
55%[$90(1+  )]+ 45%(85%)[$90(1+  )] = $90,	191 from which   =
7.24% < 81.82% (with 81.82% being the interest rate applicable to 
  	    absent insurance).192 Therefore, under   	    the cost shifted 
to the taxpayers increases to 45%(85%)[$90(1+ 7.24%)] = $36.92.193 
Now, assume that the debtholders, as above, expect Bank Alpha to stick to 
  	  with probability 3 4⁄  and to switch to   	    with probability 
1 4⁄ . Under this assumption, the breakeven interest rate becomes:   =
(3 4⁄ )5.5%+ (1 4⁄ )7.24% = 5.93%. This shows that when debtholders are 
insured, they are less sensitive to increased risk taking, which weakens the 
disciplinary effects of debt.194 Indeed, in the above example (i.e., without 
insurance), the shareholders expected to receive $2.62 under the pooling 
interest rate. Instead, with debt insurance, they expect to receive: 90%[$120−
$90(1+ 5.93%)] = $22.2.195 Under these changed circumstances, it is 
unlikely that the cost of signaling will be lower than the net gain the 
shareholders obtain under the original interest rate (i.e., 5.5%). To respect this 
condition, the cost of signaling should be lower than 90%[$120−
$90(1+ 5.5%)]− $22.2 = $0.35. Even more important, with safety nets, 
debtholders may have incentives to abandon monitoring even when they 
anticipate increased risk taking.196 To see this, assume that Bank Alpha’s 
 





 191 This condition can be generalized as follows:   
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 192 See supra text accompanying note 130. 
 193 Analytically, the taxpayers will suffer a cost equal to   
 
+          1+         . 
 194 Consistent with this simple example, spreads applied to U.S. banks did not increase before the crisis. 
RAJAN, supra note 1, at 148 (“Bank debt spreads . . . remained very moderate until just before the crisis.”). 
Indeed, bank debtholders fully anticipated a bailout and the rescue of Bear Stearns confirmed their 
expectations, making them confident that the government would intervene again. In this environment, it is 
unsurprising that the remaining big banks, including Lehman, did very little to reduce their risk exposures. 
Significantly, spreads for credit default protection against a Lehman bond default were static until shortly 
before Lehman filed for bankruptcy. See SKEEL, supra note 1, at 24, 28. 
 195 In the formal representation of the problem, it is easy to see that   
     and   
   are decreasing in  , with 
a distance of zero in the case of full insurance, i.e., when   = 1. 
 196 It could be argued that this argument does not apply to bank depositors, since this category of bank 
debtholders would be structurally unable to monitor bank risk taking. In fact, whether depositors would engage 
in active governance in a world without insurance is highly debated. Some commentators defend the argument 
that free-riding problems and the lack of sophistication of most depositors prevent them from exercising 
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debtholders decide to save the cost of monitoring. In this case, the debtholders’ 
participation constraint becomes: (1−  ) (98.5%) $90(1+ 5.5%)  +
  (93.25%) $90(1+ 5.5%)   ≥ $90,197 where   is the probability that Bank 
Alpha will undertake   	   . The solution of the participation constraint 
is given by   ≤ 0.7. This means that, as long as the debtholders expect that the 
proportion of banks that will switch to   	    is not higher than 70%, 
monitoring is not efficient for them. And if debtholders are fully insured in the 
case of a bank failure—like depositors are—then they will never have an 
incentive to engage in monitoring.198 
2. Inactive Bank Shareholders 
The distortions introduced by safety nets lead to a theory of rational 
shareholder passivity. As shown by the simple examples above,199 with bank 
debtholders’ opportunistic abandonment of monitoring, bank shareholders 
have no incentives to police governance arrangements that induce risk taking. 
Instead, these arrangements serve their interests. The fact that shareholders 
suffered large losses during the crisis does not contradict this thesis. This is 
 
adequate monitoring. See, e.g., DEWATRIPONT & TIROLE, supra note 12, at 31–32. Others, instead, argue that 
without insurance, depositors would exercise governance to discipline their banks’ risk taking. See, e.g., 
Macey & O’Hara, supra note 93, at 98. This Article is inclined to agree with this second view. Deposit 
insurance currently covers up to $250,000 for each bank customer’s account that meets the requirement of the 
different ownership categories the FDIC’s regulation provides for. See FDIC Insurance Coverage Basics, FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/insured/basics.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2011). 
This potentially extends insurance coverage up to $1,250,000. It seems thus reasonable to assume that at least 
bank customers holding similar amounts would monitor their banks without insurance. And even assuming 
that small bank depositors have limited ability to discipline their banks, this Article’s theory of bank 
governance is still robust because interbank depositors, subordinated debtholders, and bondholders would have 
both the incentives and the resources to discipline banks in a world without bailouts. 
 197 Here, the participation constraint is determined as follows. The debtholders expect to receive the value 
of their claims with probability  1−    when Bank Alpha undertakes  	 . That is, they expect to 
receive:	90% $90 1+ 5.5%  + 	10% 85%  $90 1+ 5.5%   =   98.5%  $90 1+ 5.5%    = $93.52. 
Conversely, they expect to receive the value of their claims with probability   when Bank Alpha undertakes 
 	   , with the interest rate on debt still being 5.5%. Indeed, because the debtholders avoid monitoring 
and, therefore, have no inference on the undertaking of  	   , the interest rate remains unchanged. 
Hence, under  	   , the debtholders expect to receive  55%  $90 1+ 5.5%  + 
 45%  85%  $90 1+ 5.5%   =  98.5%  $90  1+ 5.5%  = $88.12. 
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 , then  ̂ <  ∗. In particular, 




= 0, the shareholders have no incentive to signal. 
 199 See supra Part II.D.1. 
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merely the ex post story. Decisions were made ex ante. And ex ante there was 
weak, if any, debtholder discipline. Bad outcomes were only remote risks. 
Hence, managers pursuing more risk taking were acting in the interests of their 
shareholders, who had no incentives to actively counter risky management 
actions. 
Consistent with this theoretical explanation, empirical studies observe that 
the banks that suffered the largest losses during 2007–2008 were also the ones 
that enjoyed the highest equity returns in the prior years.200 Significantly, these 
studies also find that while banks that made aggressive use of equity-based 
compensation were among the worst performers during the crisis, they also 
outperformed the market before the crisis.201 This same story explains why 
shareholders tolerated lax risk management in the run-up to the crisis. Under 
the modern model of liquidity production, a single asset can be more or less 
risky depending on how it is managed. In other terms, risk management 
basically serves to control tail risk.202 But because shareholders profited from 
tail risk, they had no incentives to encourage stringent risk management.203 
Finally, the theory of rationally passive bank shareholders also connects to the 
abundant empirical evidence about captured or ineffective bank boards.204 
“Truly independent” directors put their reputations at stake. Because 
independent directors will suffer blows to their reputations in the event of a 
bank failure, they are unlikely to share the preferences of shareholders who are 
 
 200 See, e.g., Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit 
Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation 2 (European Corporate 
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 254/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id= 
1433502 (“[T]he banks in the worst quartile of performance during the crisis [2007–2008] had an average 
return of -87.44% . . . but an average return of 33.07% in 2006.”). 
 201 See Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison Hong & Jose A. Scheinkman, Yesterday’s Heroes: Compensation and 
Creative Risk-Taking 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16176, 2010), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w16176 (suggesting that the banks tarred today because of the aggressive use of equity 
compensation were “yesterday’s heroes”). 
 202 See GILLES BÉNÉPLANC & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, RISK MANAGEMENT IN TURBULENT TIMES 7 
(2011) (describing risk management functions as decisions on: (i) “[h]ow much risk to take”; (ii) “[h]ow much 
of this risk to retain and how much to insure or transfer to financial or insurance markets”; (iii) how much 
capital to keep as a buffer against the potential losses arising from retained risk; and (iv) “[h]ow much liquid 
reserves to maintain”). Apart from the first decision, which relates to the acquisition of an asset, the other risk 
management decisions are designed to modify the risk the asset’s holder bears. To this extent, asset risk 
depends on the risk management policy of the asset’s holder. 
 203 Consistently, empirical findings show that before the crisis banks with stronger risk control invested 
less in securitization operations, despite the higher profits. Andrew Ellul & Vijay Yerramilli, Stronger Risk 
Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 68 J. FIN. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1550361. 
 204 See supra notes 95, 108. 
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seeking tail risk. Therefore, it was in the interest of bank shareholders not to 
counter widespread dual-hatting practices205 or demand more independent 
boards.206 
III. REFORMING BANKS’ REGULATORY DISCIPLINE 
The previous Part discussed banks’ governance mechanisms in theory and 
in practice, explaining that an apparently weak governance of risk is rational 
for bank shareholders unconstrained by debt discipline. Part III puts forward a 
normative case for a reform of bank regulation aimed at incentivizing more 
socially desirable bank governance structures. 
The corporate governance deficiencies exposed by the financial crisis have 
induced Congress to include in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act a number of governance-related provisions, 
including new provisions on executive compensation and shareholders’ access 
to proxy materials.207 In the banking sector, however, the new legislation is 
unlikely to improve corporate governance practices in the long run. 
Subscribing to the view that weak governance arrangements in banks have 
been the result of managerial opportunism, the measures introduced by the 
Dodd-Frank Act aim at empowering shareholder voice.208 This reform 
 
 205 Several policy reports have attributed the lack of true directors’ independence to the widespread 
practice of vesting CEOs with the position of board chairman. See, e.g., BASEL PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNANCE, 
supra note 20, at 18–20 (highlighting the importance of measures designed to constrain the potential negative 
influence of dual-hatting practices). 
 206 This argument is also supported by empirical evidence finding that shareholders at financial 
institutions with more independent directors suffered larger losses because independent board members 
encouraged their banks to raise more equity capital. See David H. Erkens et al., Corporate Governance in the 
2007–2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 389, 390 
(2012) (investigating a sample of banks in thirty countries from January 2007 to September 2008). Indeed, 
while the actions of independent directors promoted banking stability, they transferred wealth from the 
shareholders to the debtholders. Id. This is consistent with the idea that opportunistic shareholders will tend to 
dislike truly independent directors. 
 207 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 951–57, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1907 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). The governance 
provisions introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act affect all public companies in the United States, not just banks 
and other financial companies. Among others, these provisions include non-binding shareholder votes (i.e., 
say-on-pay), measures on the independence of compensation committees, compensation limits, and clawback 
provisions. Id. In addition, Subtitle G of Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act, which is titled “Strengthening 
Corporate Governance,” includes a limited number of provisions about shareholders’ access to proxy materials 
and disclosure obligations for companies that combine the CEO and board chairman position. See id. §§ 971, 
972, 124 Stat. at 1915. 
 208 See Sepe, supra note 36, at 229–31 (discussing features of shareholders’ empowerment introduced by 
Dodd-Frank). 
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approach, however, disregards the fact that the absence of debt discipline in the 
banking sector makes shareholders opportunistic principals who favor 
increased risk taking.209 
This Part suggests that a better approach to improve bank governance 
would restore effective disciplining incentives for bank shareholders. 
Empowering private monitoring of banking organizations through the 
elimination of safety nets could appear as the natural solution to achieve this 
goal. But safety nets are an inevitable response to bank runs and the 
macroeconomic shocks from individual bank failures. Therefore, they cannot 
be eliminated. Accordingly, the necessary premise for effective private 
ordering of the banking sector is lacking. In response, this Part focuses on 
reform of the prudential regulation of banks—or “safety-and-soundness” 
regulation as this body of rules is more commonly referred to in the United 
States. This regulation currently focuses on banks’ capitalization, based on the 
belief that larger equity cushions provide sufficient deterrence against the 
undertaking of inefficient risks in the banking sector.210 But concentrating on 
capital requirements alone is not only socially expensive, it is also an imperfect 
method to constrain incentives for increased risk taking. Instead, ongoing 
legislative efforts to strengthen prudential regulation would benefit from the 
endorsement of a contractarian approach: bank regulators should act as 
substitutes for bank debtholders, exerting the same kind of discipline 
debtholders would bargain for if they were not implicitly or explicitly insured. 
Consistent with this contractarian ideal, regulators should expand the set of 
regulatory tools they use to discipline banks, making capital requirements and 
deposit insurance premiums sensitive to the risk propensity of a bank’s 
organizational structure. This would incentivize bank shareholders to depart 
from current CEO-centric models and to seek, instead, the implementation of 
safe governance arrangements. As this Article’s analysis suggests, 
shareholders should be driven to accept advocacy models. 
A. Self-Regulation and Safety Nets 
In the absence of safety nets, governance theory predicts that bank 
shareholders would actively seek safe governance arrangements. Accordingly, 
the elimination of safety nets would be a path to supposedly beneficial self-
 
 209 See id. at 225–27 (arguing that Dodd-Frank’s failure to consider simultaneity issues in executive 
compensation design has the potential to exacerbate, rather than improve, compensation practices). 
 210 See infra text accompanying notes 231–32. 
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regulation of the banking sector. Advocates for self-regulation point out that 
this reform would expose bank investors to a real threat of failure and therefore 
give them the right incentives to monitor and discipline banks’ risk taking.211 
However, two reasons suggest that this is neither a desirable nor credible 
direction for policy reform. The first is that safety nets successfully protect the 
banking system in uncertain times, avoiding catastrophic spillover effects.212 
The second, which follows as a corollary of the first, is that legislative 
commitments against the future use of safety nets are not credible. 
Safety nets are needed to avoid individual bank failures that may result in 
macroeconomic shocks. Even a single run may have systemic effects, either 
through contagion effects (i.e., “bank panics”) or interbank correlation.213 And, 
as discussed earlier, in modern banking the risk of runs has drastically 
increased because of banks’ growing recourse to short-term liabilities.214 
Therefore, the protection of safety nets is needed even more today to protect 
the integrity of the banking system. 
Given the essential functions served by safety nets, no legislation can be 
trusted to end use of these measures.215 Despite promises for the future made 
by the current administration216 and the explicit anti-bailout declaration 
 
 211 For a recent scholarly treatment of financial self-regulation, see Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as 
Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 413 (2011), which 
suggested that a policy of selective intervention designed to exclude systemic institutions’ access to safety nets 
would be beneficial to promote effective industry self-regulation. Self-regulation advocates also suggest that 
empowering private monitoring of banks would mitigate the informational asymmetry problems that affect 
regulatory action. Therefore, it would also reduce regulatory arbitrage, which occurs when regulated subjects 
employ “a perfectly legal planning technique . . . . [that] exploits the gap between the economic substance of a 
transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment.” Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 
229 (2010). 
 212 Since the crisis began, 490 banks have failed, as compared to the 26 bank failures that were registered 
between 2000 and 2007. See Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/ 
failed/banklist.html (last updated Oct. 11, 2012). While these figures are significant, they are not even 
comparable to those experienced during the 1933 banking crisis, before the adoption of deposit insurance. 
Indeed, about 9,000 banks failed between 1930 and 1933. See The First Fifty Years, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/firstfifty/chapter3.html (last updated July 24, 2006). 
 213 See supra Part I.B. 
 214 See supra text accompanying notes 183–85. 
 215 See Narayana Kocherlakota, Taxing Risk and the Optimal Regulation of Financial Institutions 2 (May 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/eppapers/10-3/eppaper10-
3_taxrisk.pdf (“[N]o matter how well-written or how well-intentioned the legislation may be . . . . no 
legislation can completely eliminate bailouts.”). 
 216 Before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, President Barack Obama expressly stated that this was a 
central intention of his administration. See David M. Herszenhorn & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House and 
Democrats Join to Press Case on Financial Controls, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, at B1 (“‘I am absolutely 
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included in the preamble of the Dodd-Frank Act,217 these commitments are 
simply not credible. In the jargon of economists, anti-bailout commitments are 
affected by a time-inconsistency problem.218 Before a crisis—or in its 
immediate aftermath—policymakers understand that expectations of future 
government support will engender moral hazard and other inefficiencies.219 Ex 
post, however, the need to avoid systemic collapse will induce policymakers to 
renege on prior promises, especially in the case of large (i.e., too big to fail) 
financial institutions.220 Therefore, policy reform efforts should take the safety-
net system for granted and focus on prudential regulation, that is, the body of 
rules that is designed to keep banks safe and sound. 
B. A Contractarian Approach to Prudential Regulation 
Prudential regulation comprises the system of key requirements and 
restrictions that regulators employ to maintain the solvency of financial 
institutions. At the heart of this system there are four key sets of provisions: (i) 
supervision rules; (ii) activities restrictions; (iii) deposit insurance rules; and 
 
confident that the bill that emerges is going to be a bill that prevents bailouts. That’s the goal,’ Mr. Obama 
said . . . .”). 
 217 The preamble of the Dodd-Frank Act lists the need “to end ‘too big to fail’, [and] to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts” among its core purposes. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 218 This type of time inconsistency was first informally discussed by Kydland and Prescott in the context 
of government investment in flood control. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than 
Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473, 473 (1977). Recent economic research 
has looked at the time-inconsistency problem affecting the regulatory enforcement of anti-bailout policies. See, 
e.g., Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Too Many to Fail—An Analysis of Time-Inconsistency in Bank 
Closure Policies, 16 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 1, 1 (2007); V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, Bailouts, Time 
Inconsistency and Optimal Regulation (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.econ. 
yale.edu/seminars/macro/mac10/chari-100216.pdf; see also Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 2, at 1403–08 
(suggesting the adoption of a “Bright-Line Limit” to avoid banks becoming too big as a solution to the limited 
commitment problem underlying anti-bailout policies). 
 219 See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 2, at 1370. 
 220 The failure of regulatory initiatives aimed at limiting the use of safety nets is often attributed to 
political self-interest and regulatory capture. See Frederic S. Mishkin, How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail? 
A Review of Gary Stern and Ron Feldman’s Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, 44 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 988, 992–94 (2006). But there is a more radical explanation for the ineffectiveness of these 
initiatives: safety nets, despite their flaws, are ex post efficient to prevent bank failures from damaging the 
economy as a whole. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439, 451–53 (2011) 
(suggesting that for too-big-to-fail financial institutions—defined as those financial institutions whose “failure 
might trigger socially unacceptable macroeconomic consequences”—bailouts are inevitable). In this respect, 
while the Dodd-Frank Act subjects the ability of both the Federal Reserve and the FDIC to rescue troubled 
financial organizations to stricter tests, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
§§ 1101, 1104–05, the risk is that regulatory discretion might be reintroduced upon a future financial crisis. 
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(iv) capital adequacy requirements.221 The need to protect small bank 
depositors—perceived as unable to adequately protect their interests because of 
insufficient sophistication and coordination problems—has provided the 
traditional rationale for subjecting banks to such an extensive body of rules.222 
However, the steady increase of deposit insurance coverage and the evolution 
of modern banking have paved the way for the emergence of a more 
fundamental rationale for prudential regulation: preventing systemic risk and, 
with it, costly ex post interventions by the government in support of failing 
banks.223 
From a contractarian perspective,224 these rationales can be unified under a 
common substitution hypothesis.225 According to this hypothesis, prudential 
regulators should act as substitutes for opportunistic bank debtholders, exerting 
on banks the same kind of discipline debtholders would bargain for if they 
were uninsured. The benefits of this substitution are easily grasped. The public 
provision of governance functions addresses the vacuum left in banks’ 
governance mechanisms by insured debtholders’ relinquishment of power. The 
realism of such an approach to banks’ regulatory discipline is confirmed by the 
close resemblance that key prudential rules bear to the exercise of debtholder 
governance in private contracting.226 Like monitoring and informational 
covenants, banks’ supervisory systems provide for close scrutiny of banking 
activities. Banks are required to disclose a massive amount of information to 
regulators and are subject to periodic evaluations, which produce examination 
ratings.227 Along the same line, restrictions on bank activities—similar to 
 
 221 For a general discussion of the basic principles of the prudential regulation of banks in the United 
States, see RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING 
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2009), and LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK 
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES (2d ed. 2001). 
 222 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 223 See Acharya, supra note 70, at 225 (“It is thus broadly understood that the goal of prudential 
regulation should be to ensure the financial stability of the system as a whole, i.e., of an institution not only 
individually but also as a part of the overall financial system.”). 
 224 Contractarianism, as a general approach to institutions, assumes that legal norms “find legitimacy, 
when they do, in their ability to secure (under the appropriate conditions) the agreement of those to whom they 
apply.” Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Contractarianism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY 247, 247 
(Hugh LaFollette ed., 2000) (providing an excellent discussion of contractarianism in contemporary moral and 
political thought). Modern contractarianism finds its roots in the monumental contribution of JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 225 For a discussion of the differences between this Article’s substitution hypothesis and the representation 
hypothesis articulated by economists Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, see supra note 12. 
 226 See DEWATRIPONT & TIROLE, supra note 12, at 87. 
 227 See infra notes 254–55 and accompanying text (discussing examination ratings). 
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investment restrictions included in debt agreements—constrain banks’ abilities 
to take actions that may jeopardize their solvency. These restrictions include 
operating non-financial lines of business, concentrating risk exposures to one 
borrower, or having excessive interbank credit exposures. Further, provisions 
on risk-based pricing of deposit insurance premiums approximate interest-rate 
negotiations. As riskier debtors are required to pay higher interest rates, banks 
that pose a higher risk of causing a loss to the insurance fund are required to 
pay higher insurance premiums.228 Finally, minimum capital requirements that 
mandate banks to maintain a minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets 
in addition to liquidity ratios can be likened to financial covenants included in 
debt agreements.229 
But the substitution hypothesis offers more than just a better descriptive 
account of the need for prudential regulation; it provides a normative 
framework to define the scope and shape of this regulation. The contractarian 
argument underpinning this hypothesis calls for a reform intervention that is 
“normatively constructivist,” under which “deliberative rationality” provides 
the justification for banks’ regulatory discipline.230 This means that reform 
intervention should lead to a regulatory framework that replicates the 
hypothetical outcome in which bank shareholders would self-interestedly agree 
 
 228 See infra note 257 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of deposit insurance premiums). 
 229 U.S. bank capital regulation is largely based on the guidelines issued by the Basel Committee in 1988 
(known as Basel I). See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASURES AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf. As 
embraced by U.S. regulation, these guidelines provide for a risk-weighting system of capital ratios, based on 
the assignment of assets to risk buckets, each associated with a different risk weight. Under this system, a bank 
is deemed adequately capitalized if its ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets exceeds an 8% threshold—with 
eligible capital being defined on a consolidated basis as primarily consisting of common equity; preferred 
stock and other hybrid instruments; subordinated debt; and disclosed and undisclosed bank reserves. See 12 
C.F.R. § 225 (2012). In 2004, the Basel Committee enacted a new set of rules (known as Basel II), introducing 
an additional methodology for risk computation in large banks (i.e., the “advanced approach”). Under this 
novel approach, banks can opt for an alternative system based on internal risk management models and rating 
agencies’ credit assessments. See BASEL PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNANCE, supra note 20. In the United States, 
the advanced approach was introduced in November 2007, with applicability limited to large banks. See BD. 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, INTERAGENCY STATEMENT—U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL II 
ADVANCED APPROACHES FRAMEWORK (2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/ 
2008/SR0804a1.pdf. In the wake of the crisis, Basel II has undergone intense criticism for giving too much 
leeway to banks in effectively setting their own capital requirements. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, The 
Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 144–49 (2009). 
 230 See David Gauthier, Political Contractarianism, 5 J. POL. PHIL. 132, 133 (1997) (“The contractarian 
position is . . . constructivist. That is, the entire normative structure of a society is conceived by the 
contractarian to depend on the deliberative normativity of its individual members. Each from her own 
deliberative stance must judge the social norms . . . as ones to which it would make sense for her to 
agree . . . .”). 
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to negotiate with uninsured bank debtholders. Governance theory predicts that 
this outcome would involve bank shareholders’ commitment to more 
conservative risk choices through the use of safe governance arrangements. 
But, in contrast with the contractarian ideal, the current regulatory practice 
largely fails to consider bank governance and focuses instead on capital-related 
rules—primarily, capital requirements. However, as explained below, this is a 
crude response to address banks’ risk taking and the negative consequences 
this conduct may have at both the individual bank level and economy-wide 
level. 
1. The Limits of Capital Requirements 
The argument for the overwhelming role of capital standards in banks’ 
regulatory discipline is straightforward: reckless risk taking is unprofitable for 
shareholders of adequately capitalized banks.231 A larger equity buffer reduces 
the expected gains from taking more risk, functioning as a sort of deductible to 
be paid out of the pockets of shareholders before the trigger of deposit 
insurance or other safety-net measures. Based on the same argument, recent 
proposals to improve the effectiveness of prudential regulation have suggested 
that reform interventions should be directed to raise capital requirements.232 
But concentrating prudential regulation on capital requirements is an imperfect 
and limited approach. To understand why, consider again the example on 
excessive risk taking, in which Bank Alpha may substitute   	    for 
  	  after the issuance of debt. This time, however, assume, for 
simplicity, that Bank Alpha’s capital structure only includes equity and fully 
insured deposits. Under this assumption the interest portion on debt will 
always be zero.233 Hence, Bank Alpha’s capital structure becomes $10	equity 
and $90 debt. Note that this change does not affect the preferences of Bank 
 
 231 The standard reference is Daesik Kim & Anthony M. Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital 
Regulation, 43 J. FIN. 1219 (1988). For a more recent contribution, see Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, 
Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive 16 
(Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 86, 2011), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1669704. 
 232 See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, in 
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 143–
81 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011) (suggesting raising banks’ capital ratios and liquidity ratios); Admati et 
al., supra note 231, at 2 (arguing that “better capitalized banks are less inclined to make excessively risky 
investments that benefit shareholders and managers at the expense of debt holders or the government”). 
 233 Full insurance implies that all of Bank Alpha’s depositors will be fully reimbursed with probability 1 
in the event of bank failure. See supra note 187. Accordingly, since   = 1,    =      = 0 always holds and 
therefore the outstanding debt is always  . 
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Alpha’s shareholders for   	   , since this project remains the most 
profitable for them: i.e., [55%($180− $90)] = $49.5 > [90%($120−
$90)] = $27. 
Suppose now that bank regulators anticipate that projects like     	    
may become available to banks, including Bank Alpha. Therefore, they require 
Bank Alpha to raise additional equity capital equal to $∆  to deter the 
undertaking of   	   . Further suppose that Bank Alpha’s manager, as 
occurs in reality, will invest $∆  into one of the available projects (i.e., either 
  	  or   	   ). This implies that the shareholders’ expected payoff 
from   	 	 and   	    become respectively: 90%[($100+




and 1.8 (i.e., 
$ 
$
) are the gross returns in the event of success of each project. 
Thus, in order to redress the shareholders’ incentives for the undertaking of 
  	 —and therefore their incentives for exercising adequate monitoring 
on the manager—the regulators will need to set $∆  to satisfy the following 
condition:	90%[($100+ $∆ )1.2− $90] > 55%[($100+ $∆ )1.8−
$90].234 It is easy to see that the appropriate capital requirement to deter the 
undertaking of   	    is $∆  > $250	(i.e.,	$∆ 	 >  [55%($180−
$100)]− [90%($120− $100)] /[90%(1.2)− 55%(1.8)]).235 
This simple example offers several insights into the use of capital 
requirements to constrain increased risk taking in banks. There is, however, a 
preliminary consideration. For simplicity, the example has assumed that 
regulators are perfectly informed about possible increases in the risk of a 
bank’s asset pool. But regulators generally face informational lags vis-à-vis 
banks.236 Therefore, they may fail to accurately determine the riskiness of bank 
assets, which, in turn, may compromise their ability to provide for well-
measured and appropriate capital requirements. Even leaving aside this 
difficulty, the example above shows that capital requirements need to be very 
high in order to provide effective deterrence against excessive risk taking. 
 
 234 Formally, with the new equity injection, the shareholders’ expected payoff becomes  
 
 
  1+ ∆    −   +
 
 
  1+ ∆   −    under  	  and   
 
+  





−         1+ ∆    −  		under  	   . 
 235 The amount       1+ ∆     −   −       1+ ∆   −    that the shareholders would get by 




. The latter condition 
requires that         >        −  , which is always satisfied since  	   	 by assumption has a 
negative net present value, i.e.,        −    >        −  . 
 236 See supra note 211. 
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Specifically, Bank Alpha’s debt-to-equity ratio needs to change from 
($90 $10⁄ ) = 9 to [$90 ($10+ $250)⁄ ] = 0.346 to eliminate the shareholders’ 
incentives for the undertaking of   	   . In fact, the complete eradication 
of incentives for excessive risk taking would command such high capital 
requirements that there would be a radical transformation of banks’ business 
models and banks would be unable to fulfill “their economic missions,” which 
is “the provision of liquidity to firms and markets.”237 
This result changes only quantitatively when one considers that in reality 
capital requirements have the more limited purpose of constraining, rather than 
eliminating, incentives for excessive risk taking. Capital requirements are a 
function of a bank’s estimated probability of default or, in the financial jargon, 
a bank’s expected loss given default (LGD).238 The LGD is the credit loss that 
a firm’s creditors bear upon the firm’s default. In the specific case of banks, 
however, this loss is largely borne by the government, as insurer of bank 
deposits and lender of last resort, and, ultimately, the taxpayers who stand 
behind public rescue plans. Thus, the essential function of capital requirements 
is to reduce the LGD that the public system bears upon a bank’s failure. 
However, this more truthful representation of how capital regulation works 
does not change the fact that capital requirements need to be very high in order 
to be effective. Although capital regulation has less draconian consequences 
than those envisioned by the above example, it still tends to be socially 
expensive. Banks may escape higher capital requirements by accepting fewer 
deposits. This, in turn, may create distortions in banks’ lending decisions by 
reducing available loans or inducing banks to charge higher interest rates on 
the loans they make.239 Additionally, high capital requirements may penalize 
bank shareholders excessively, which, in turn, generates other social costs. For 
one thing, shareholders’ incentives for increased risk taking may increase 
under higher capital requirements. Shareholders may perceive the extra profits 
of riskier projects as compensation for the negative impact of capital regulation 
 
 237 DEWATRIPONT ET AL., supra note 185, at 49; see also Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 2, at 1411–12 
(observing that for capital regulation to solve banks’ moral hazard problems, it should be so extreme that 
banks “would cease to play any role in providing capital to the economy”). 
 238 See Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, The Procyclical Effects of Basel II, VOX (July 14, 2008), http:// 
www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1398 (observing that “Basel II makes capital requirements an increasing 
function of banks’ estimates of their loans’ probability of default and loss given default”). 
 239 See Skander J. Van den Heuvel, The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements, 55 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 298 (2008) (providing a formal discussion of the effects of high capital requirements on banks’ access 
to deposits); Anjan V. Thakor, Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory 
and Empirical Evidence, 51 J. FIN. 279, 281 (1996) (showing that high capital requirements may increase 
credit rationing and negatively impact economic growth). 
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on their investment.240 More drastically, high capital requirements may induce 
shareholders to redirect their investments toward more profitable industries, 
with the result of reducing banks’ funding sources and, therefore, available 
lending. Further, restrictive capital regulation may exacerbate procyclicality 
problems: it may amplify negative business fluctuations.241 Economic shocks 
lower banks’ capital. In response, regulators force banks to raise additional 
capital. But a time of recession is precisely when capital is hardest to raise. 
Therefore, capital regulation may have contractionary effects on liquidity 
production, which, in turn, can exacerbate the negative effects of economic 
shocks. 
But the example above yields an additional, and perhaps more important, 
insight on the use of capital regulation to constrain bank risk taking: counter-
intuitively, appropriate capital requirements need to be highest when the 
impact of increased risk taking is lowest. So, in the example, $∆  increases 
when the loss in the gross return is lower (i.e., [90%(1.2)− 55%(1.8)]). This 
implies that there are scenarios where using capital regulation alone to 
constrain increased risk taking is not just inefficient, it is ineffective. Indeed, 
the above example shows that no feasible capital requirement can deter the 
undertaking of asset substitution.242 This form of increased risk taking tends to 
be perceived as a minor problem because it has only distributive effect at the 
individual firm level. Instead, excessive risk taking has allocative effects, that 
is, it destroys total wealth. But conflating these two issues or placing them on 
equal footing is a fallacious oversimplification; as shown in this Article, it 
neglects to consider that asset substitution strategies might lead to aggregate 
welfare losses when banks are highly interconnected.243 
2. Contracting Around Bank Governance 
The above analysis of capital regulation has shown that even high and well-
measured capital requirements cannot optimally constrain banks’ incentives for 
increased risk taking. And, in any event, such requirements are likely to burden 
 
 240 See Laeven & Levine, supra note 45, at 260 (“Owners might compensate for the loss of utility from 
more stringent capital requirements by selecting a riskier investment portfolio.”). 
 241 See FIN. STABILITY BD., ADDRESSING FINANCIAL SYSTEM PROCYCLICALITY: A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK 
7 (2008), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904e.pdf (advancing policy 
proposals to mitigate the problem of procyclicality of capital regulations); Repullo & Suarez, supra note 238 
(arguing that Basel II has exacerbated the procyclical effects of banks’ capital requirements). 
 242 See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing asset substitution). 
 243 See supra Part I.B (providing an example of the potential systemic risk that arises from asset 
substitution, given high interbank correlation). 
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banks’ shareholders with excessive regulatory costs. This analysis suggests 
that there is room for Coasean bargaining between banks and regulators.244 To 
see why, consider this Article’s introductory example on asset substitution, 
where after the issuance of debt Bank Alpha may switch from   	 	to 
  	  . 
As in the example in Part III.B.1, suppose that Bank Alpha’s capital 
structure only includes equity for $10 and fully insured deposits for $90. This 
change to the original setting enhances the preference of Bank Alpha’s 
shareholders for   	  , since [72%($150− $90)] = $43.2 >
[90%($120− $90)] = $27. Now, as above, suppose that the regulators 
anticipate that   	  	may become available to banks, including Bank 
Alpha. This time, however, suppose that the regulators will more realistically 
set the appropriate capital requirement based on Bank Alpha’s loss given 
default (i.e., the credit loss the public system bears in case of Bank Alpha’s 
default). Under   	  the LGD is equal to 10%($90) = $9, while under 
  	   it is 28%($90) = $25.2.245 Thus, the undertaking of   	   
determines an increase in the LGD equal to $25.2− $9 = $16.2. Assume that 
the regulators determine that the maximum LGD the public system (i.e., the 
government and the taxpayers) can bear is equal to $10.246 This implies that 
they will need to set Bank Alpha’s capital requirement to reduce the LGD 
under   	   to $10. That is, the regulators will need to demand an 
injection of additional equity capital that is sufficient to bring Bank Alpha’s 
leverage down from $90 to $35.71 (since 28%($35.71) = $10). As a result, 
in order to meet the $100 outlay required to pursue either   	  or 
 
 244 As made clear by the ensuing discussion, regulators produce externalities to shareholders by imposing 
higher capital requirements, and shareholders impose externalities on regulators by selecting Project II. In this 
context, the contracting part of the Coase Theorem states that parties will find it efficient to contract around 
externalities in order to reach a Pareto improvement. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1960). 
 245 Formally,  	 	has an LGD equal to 
 
 
   −    =   . Instead, when Bank Alpha switches to 
 	  	 the LGD increases to   
 
+         −    =     >   , where     −   =       −   . 
 246 The level of acceptable LGD can be interpreted as a function of, for example, the targeted value of the 
FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) for the current year, the level of national deficit, and the shadow costs of 
bureaucracy. The latter are the transaction costs that the government bears to channel public funds to troubled 
banks. See Jean Tirole, Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market 
Functioning, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 29, 55 (2012) (suggesting that the magnitude of government intervention 
must be balanced against the cost of public funds, since the use of these funds is not a mere transfer of 
resources but implies high transaction costs). 
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  	  , Bank Alpha’s capital structure will need to change from $90 debt 
plus $10 equity to $35.71 debt plus $64.29 equity.247 
What effects does this mandated change in Bank Alpha’s capital structure 
have on the shareholders’ investment and the costs the public system bears to 
avoid bank failure? To address this question, start by considering the payoffs 
of Bank Alpha’s shareholders—measured here in terms of expected gross 
return on equity (ROE)248—with and without the additional equity injection. 
Under the original equity ratio of $90/$10, the shareholders’ expected gross 
ROE is [90%($120− $90)] ($10)⁄ = 2.7 when Bank Alpha undertakes 
  	  and [72%($150− $90)] ($10)⁄ = 4.32 when Bank Alpha 
undertakes    	  . Under the increased debt/equity ratio of $35.71/
$64.29, the shareholders’ expected gross ROE instead is 
[90%($120− $35.71)] ($64.29)⁄ = 1.18 when Bank Alpha undertakes 
  	  and [72%($150− $35.71)] ($64.29)⁄ = 1.28 when Bank Alpha 
undertakes   	  . 
Consider now the payoff of regulators (i.e., the public system), expressed 
for convenience as the negative of the actual LGD relative to the socially 
tolerable LGD of $10.249 Under the original equity ratio of $90/$10, the 
regulators’ expected payoff is −($9 $10)⁄ = −0.9 when Bank Alpha 
undertakes   	  and −($25.2 $10)⁄ = −2.52 when Bank Alpha 
undertakes   	  . Under the increased equity ratio of $35.71/$64.29, the 
regulators’ expected payoff instead is −[(10%($35.71))] ($10)⁄ = −0.357 
when Bank Alpha undertakes   	 	and −[(28%($35.71))] ($10)⁄ = −1 
when Bank Alpha undertakes   	  . 
The matrix depicted in Figure 5 below illustrates the payoffs of Bank 
Alpha’s shareholders and the regulators for the combination of possible actions 
that they can play: 
 
 247 Letting    be the socially optimal LGD, the required increase in Bank Alpha’s equity capital is 
determined by the following equation:   
 
+          −   −    =   , which gives 
  =        −    /  
 
+     . 
 248 Here the expected equity returns of Bank Alpha’s shareholders are measured through ROE to make the 
dilution effects that higher capital requirements produce on equity clearer. 
 249 This is a simple normalization of the regulators’ payoff, which does not change the regulators’ 
preferences over the available courses of action. 
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The matrix shows that the only equilibrium of the “game” between the 
regulators and Bank Alpha’s shareholders is the strategy profile 
  	  ; 	 	 .250 What matters the most, under the rules of 
the game (i.e., the existing regulation), is that the selection of 
  	  ; 	 	  is an equilibrium in dominant strategy. This 
means that whatever the strategy (i.e., the course of action) of the regulators, 
Bank Alpha’s shareholders are always better off by selecting   	  .251 
And, similarly, whatever the strategy (i.e., the course of action) of Bank 
Alpha’s shareholders, the regulators are always better off by selecting 
   	 .252 But the strategy profile   	  ; 
 	  also is the most inefficient outcome of the game, being 
the one that yields the lowest aggregate payoff, i.e., $0.28. Instead, the 
efficient outcome would be the strategy profile   	 ; 	    −
 	 , which yields an aggregate payoff of $1.8. This strategy also 
yields higher payoff for both Bank Alpha’s shareholders and the regulators 
relative to the payoff each of them obtains under   	  ; 
	 	 .253 Thus, the equilibrium of the game shows that there is 
 
 250 In game theory, a dominant strategy is a strategy that each player plays independently from what the 
other is doing. See generally John F. Nash, Jr., Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 48, 48–49 (1950). 
 251 Indeed, even with the higher capital requirement,  	  	is still more profitable for the 
shareholders. Formally, by switching to  	  , the shareholders gain       −  −      −    −    , 







=   >  . 
 252 This is trivially given by the fact that    <    . 
 253 It is important to emphasize that while the strategy profile  	  ; 	   −  	    also 
yields an aggregate payoff of $1.8, the strategy  	 ; 	   −  	    is more efficient under the 
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room for Coasean bargaining, as long as two conditions are satisfied. The first 
is that the shareholders commit to the undertaking of   	  by using a 
credible signal. The second is that regulators reward this commitment through 
the exclusion of the additional capital requirement. This simple illustration 
shows that the use of safe governance arrangements, such as an advocacy 
system, would be a rational choice for bank shareholders, if this choice were 
rewarded with lower regulatory costs, such as lower capital requirements. 
Under this regulatory scheme, given a risk level acceptable to the regulators, 
bank shareholders would be able to make optimal trade-offs on two margins: 
the cost of advocacy and the cost of capital requirements. This means that 
Bank Alpha’s shareholders would optimize their regulatory cost of capital by 
choosing, for example, an advocacy model over a CEO-centric model. 
Under the current regulatory framework, however, there are only 
superficial references to banks’ governance arrangements. The only extant 
provisions on regulating bank governance come from examination ratings, 
such as the CAMELS ratings used for depository institutions.254 These criteria, 
however, are more oriented to assess bureaucratic features than real authority 
in corporate decision making.255 Thus, because of the manner in which they are 
formulated, governance requirements only provide general guidelines, which 
have little, if any, binding force. More fundamentally, governance provisions 
play almost no role in the regulators’ evaluation of a bank’s appetite for risk. 
While in principle governance ratings are incorporated in the Federal Deposit 
 
assumption that the shadow cost of public funds is non-zero (i.e., not negligible). See supra note 246. Under 
this assumption, since the regulators’ expected bailout costs are higher for  	  , the outcome 
 	  ; 	   −  	    is strictly dominated by the outcome  	 ; 	   −  	    . 
 254 CAMELS stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity 
to market risk. The CAMELS rating system provides for both the assessment of individual component ratings 
and a composite rating. Each of these assessments yields a score that can range between 1 (indicating the least 
degree of supervisory concern) and 5 (indicating the maximum degree of supervisory concern). See FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 1.1 (2012) [hereinafter FDIC 
EVALUATION POLICIES], available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section1-1.pdf. A similar 
system—the RFI/C/(D) ratings (Risk-management, Financial condition, Impact, Capital, and Depositary 
Institutions)—is used for bank holding companies. See DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REGULATION, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL (2005), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/bhc/bhc.pdf. 
 255 For example, the evaluation of a bank’s risk management system is based on very detailed provisions 
in the examination ratings. But even detailed risk management regulation is virtually useless when the overall 
organizational structure is subordinated to a CEO with a large appetite for risk. Unfortunately, existing 
examination rules fail to adequately tackle fundamental issues of control, such as board composition, expertise, 
or independence; instead, these rules are vague and only employ loose definitions, referring to indefinite 
attributes, such as “ability,” “adequacy,” “accuracy,” “[r]esponsiveness,” “[r]easonableness,” and 
“willingness.” See FDIC EVALUATION POLICIES, supra note 254, § 4.1. 
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Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) determination of deposit insurance 
premiums,256 in practice these ratings constitute a minimal part of a broad 
evaluation that is predominantly devoted to assessing a bank’s 
capitalization.257 
Thus, in contrast to what uninsured debtholders would do, bank regulators 
fail to bargain for many “contractual features” that would include not just 
capital requirements but also governance arrangements. As a result, prudential 
regulation is currently unsuitable for restoring bank shareholders’ incentives to 
select more socially responsible governance structures. To remedy this 
inefficiency, this Article suggests that bank shareholders should be allowed to 
trade safe governance arrangements for lower regulatory costs, including lower 
capital requirements and deposit insurance premiums.258 The discussion that 
follows attempts to devise potential measures to implement this change and 
addresses the possible objections. 
C. Incentivizing Advocacy in Banks 
In an ideal world, this Article’s proposal would inherently lead banks’ 
governance models to converge toward safe governance arrangements. And 
there is a sound argument for claiming that such arrangements would be built 
around an advocacy model. Assuming that regulators could hand-tailor 
 
 256 The FDIC’s “risk-based assessment system” classifies banks into three capital groups and three 
supervisory groups, which incorporate the CAMELS ratings. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A), (C) (2006); 12 
C.F.R. §§ 327.9–.10 (2012). An excellent description of the FDIC risk-based assessment system can be found 
in Risk-Based Assessment System, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/2007_ 
01/fr_risk.html (last updated July 7, 2007). 
 257 It is worth observing that in the case of capital requirements, a theoretical exchange between safe 
governance arrangements and lower capital ratios is provided in the prompt corrective action system 
introduced by the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236. This system classifies 
banking institutions in five capital-based categories, ranging from well-capitalized to critically 
undercapitalized. As a bank’s capital rating declines, prompt corrective action rules impose progressively 
stricter regulatory requirements. These rules also provide that a bank can be treated as if it belonged to the next 
lower capital category if it has received an unsatisfactory rating under the CAMELS system and has taken no 
corrective action. See 12 C.F.R. § 325.103 (2012). In practice, however, the largely residual scope of 
application of this rule, combined with the bureaucratic nature of the CAMELS governance provisions, makes 
it highly unlikely that this principle can have real teeth. In fact, when one considers the broader context of the 
prompt corrective action system, it becomes apparent that within this system bank governance only matters 
when a bank’s capital level falls to extremely low levels. 
 258 Under the same logic, banks adopting safe governance arrangements could be subject to less stringent 
activity restrictions. Since these restrictions impose opportunity costs on banks, they are a subset of regulatory 
costs. See John et al., supra note 9, at 96 (jointly considering activity restrictions and capital requirements as 
suboptimal and costly means to discipline banks). 
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negotiations with banks and appropriately price the risk incentives in banks’ 
governance arrangements, shareholders would rationally seek the 
implementation of such a model. In reality, however, regulators stand at a 
greater informational disadvantage vis-à-vis banks than debtholders in private 
contracting. Debtholders only need to monitor a limited number of borrowers 
and generally enjoy vast economic resources to accomplish this task. In 
contrast, regulators are called to supervise the banking system as a whole and 
may face severe budget constraints. Thus, imagining a regulatory system that 
perfectly mimics the operating methods of private contracting raises feasibility 
concerns. Monitoring the risk propensity of governance arrangements at 
thousands of U.S. banks would make this system so costly as to be potentially 
unmanageable. One would have to be willing to accept a high risk that banks’ 
governance arrangements might be “mispriced” by regulators. 
Thus, while this Article’s analysis applies without distinction to all kinds of 
banks, the need to address the above implementation issues suggests that the 
adoption of two different regulatory regimes would be desirable. As explained 
below, regulators should resort to one-on-one negotiations only in the case of 
“large, interconnected bank holding companies”—as defined in sections 115 
and 116 of the Dodd-Frank Act (i.e., bank holding companies “with total 
consolidated assets” of $50 billion).259 The remaining banks not falling within 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s categorization (i.e., non-systemic banks) should instead 
be subject to a standardized system. 
1. The Standardized System: Small and Medium-Sized Banks 
The theoretical background offered by contract theory assists in better 
understanding what the standardized system this Article proposes for 
regulating governance issues in non-systemic banks would entail.260 Contract 
theory suggests that in contexts of asymmetric information, a way for the 
principal to elicit private information from the agent is offering the agent a 
menu of contractual choices—a collection of payoff-relevant alternatives—to 
choose from.261 As long as this mechanism is well-designed, the agent’s choice 
 
 259 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 115–16, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1403–06 (2010) (codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325, 5326 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
 260 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 261 An example is offering a menu of contracts where each contract specifies a given price and quality 
label. The underlying intuition is that adding another contractual dimension to the negotiation between 
principal and agent (i.e., the quality label besides price) enables the principal to infer more information about 
the agent’s type. Economically, the adoption of this strategy implies a model of screening, rather than 
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of a given contract within the menu reveals her private information to the 
principal.262 Explained simply, this process sorts good types from bad types. 
Applied to judging governance at banks, a similar mechanism could be 
implemented through regulation that “offers” banks a menu of standardized 
regulatory contracts. Under these contracts, a fixed set of regulatory costs 
would correspond to some predefined combinations of organizational features. 
By opting for a given mix of organizational features, banks would reveal 
information about their risk appetite to regulators, basically assessing the 
quality of their own governance arrangements. In pragmatic terms, the 
implementation of this system would require regulators to devise a framework 
of proxies for evaluating bank governance: i.e., governance metrics. Based on 
these proxies, regulators could identify more and less risky combinations of 
organizational features and assign a corresponding set of regulatory costs. 
For feasibility issues, this Article suggests that the regulatory menu should 
include just two “contracts.”263 These contracts would limit banks’ alternatives 
to either an advocacy model or a CEO-centric model, with the distinction 
between these two options being based on a restricted, and readily observable, 
set of governance metrics. The first contract (i.e., the “advocacy contract”) 
would offer banks a fixed set of regulatory costs and an advocacy-based 
governance model. As for the set of costs, for example, it could be established 
that banks opting for the advocacy contract would be held to the standard 8% 
capital ratio that current capital adequacy rules require for adequately 
capitalized banks.264 As for the governance component, this contract would 
select a combination of organizational features that integrates the minimum 
 
signaling. The seminal contribution in this field is Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in 
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 643 
(1976), which studied screening in the insurance market. A model of screening—where the principal rather 
than the agent takes action—better characterizes the nature of the regulators’ intervention. Nevertheless, 
screening is equivalent to signaling: both strategies aim at achieving a separating equilibrium. 
 262 See id. at 629, 639–40. 
 263 This Article opts for a two-governance system instead of a large number of regulatory contracts 
because benefits from having multiple contracts are uncertain. At first glance, an increase in available 
regulatory contracts could seem to add to the precision of the system by synthetically replicating an assessment 
method based on individual negotiations with banks. But, in fact, this system can never ensure that the self-
interest choice of bank shareholders for a given combination of governance features and regulatory costs is 
socially optimal—as it happens, instead, under an ideal system of one-on-one negotiations with banks. At the 
margin, enlarging the set of available contracts may increase, rather than decrease, the risk of mispricing. And 
even assuming that providing for more regulatory contracts could add some precision to the system, designing 
such a system would bring about enormous implementation costs and, therefore, raise feasibility issues. 
 264 See supra notes 22, 229. 
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requirements any advocacy model should provide for. As discussed above, two 
features could form the baseline.265 The first is a board composed only of 
independent directors. The second is the provision that the compensation of the 
chief risk officer (CRO) cannot be tied to stock performance or any other 
equity-based measure. Moreover, there are additional organizational features 
that this stage of the analysis suggests should be included among the minimum 
requirements for implementing an advocacy model. For example, a substantial 
portion of board members should be financial experts;266 the CRO should be 
granted access to specified budget and staff; the CRO should only report to the 
board; and, finally, the CRO should be removable from her position only by 
the board and with cause.267 This combination of features would counteract a 
bias toward increased risk taking by implementing a system where the CRO 
has both the incentives and the resources to effectively exercise her risk control 
functions, acting as counterweight to risk-loving CEOs. That is, this system 
would enable the CRO to effectively provide the first line of reporting on risk 
choices, preventing risk management from becoming some cosmetic regulatory 
compliance, as it has often been at many banks in the years prior to the 
crisis.268 It would also prevent CEOs from repressing conservative risk 
managers who disagreed with them, as also happened at several prominent 
banks.269 
The second contract to be included in the regulatory menu offered to banks 
(i.e., the “CEO-centric contract”) would provide for a pair of terms that 
includes a set of fixed, but higher, regulatory costs and a CEO-centric 
governance model. The regulatory costs could, for example, be set to the 10% 
capital ratio that current capital adequacy rules require for well-capitalized 
 
 265 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 266 Some empirical studies show a positive correlation between the financial expertise of board members 
and volatility. See Bernardette A. Minton et al., Board Composition, Risk Taking and Value: Evidence from 
Financial Firms 2–3 (Aug. 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1455997. But this evidence does not show causation. In a CEO-centric governance 
model, the expert decides on the basis of the restricted, and biased, evidence provided by the CEO. Instead, in 
an advocacy model, experts are likely to add to the information aggregation process because they would be 
better able to assess the conflicting risk information produced by the CEO and the CRO. 
 267 These requirements are largely in accordance with the Basel Committee’s recommendations on 
improving bank governance. See BASEL PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNANCE, supra note 20, at 18–19 (Principles 
6.72, 6.74, 6.78, and 6.79). 
 268 See RAJAN, supra note 1, at 140 (observing that “risk management was used primarily for regulatory 
compliance rather than as an instrument of management control”). 
 269 See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 18–19 (reporting that repressing non-complacent risk 
managers was a regular practice at major banks, including Lehman Brothers, Citigroup, and Bear Stearns). 
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banks.270 As for governance provisions, this contract would include any 
governance structure that does not implement the advocacy model described 
above.271 
2. The Tailored System: Systemic Banks 
Despite the positive features of the standardized system, large, 
interconnected bank holding companies (as defined in the Dodd-Frank Act) 
should be subject to a different regulatory regime. Under this regime, the trade-
off between advocacy and lower regulatory costs should be based on individual 
negotiations between banks and regulators. Two reasons underlie the need for 
differentiated regimes based on size. First and foremost, a standardized system 
can never eliminate the likelihood of misalignment between optimal private 
sorting and optimal social sorting. Under this system, there is always the risk 
that a bank can choose an advocacy model to lower its capital requirements, 
even when higher capital requirements would be socially desirable. That is, a 
standardized system can reduce, but not eliminate, the risk of “mispricing” a 
bank’s governance arrangements. In the case of large, interconnected banks, 
this risk is likely to increase and have more severe consequences due to the 
complexity of these banks’ asset pools and their systemic importance. Second, 
the relatively small number of large, interconnected banks (about thirty 
today)272 would make an assessment system based on individual negotiations 
feasible, whereas the high number of small and medium-sized banks would 
make it impossible.273 
Practically, an individualized assessment system of the trade-off between 
advocacy and lower regulatory costs would involve the following steps. First, 
 
 270 See supra notes 23, 229. 
 271 The current corporate governance structure of Bank of America, where the CRO is compensated 
through large stock option plans and reports to the CEO, offers a stylized example of a bank that would be 
deemed to have chosen a CEO-centric model pursuant to the regulatory reform envisioned by this Article. See 
Jeff Green, Chief Risk Officer Rises to $10 Million Job Following Derivatives Meltdown, BLOOMBERG (July 
11, 2011, 2:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-11/risk-officer-rises-to-10-million-job-after-
derivatives-meltdown.html (reporting similar organizational features at major U.S. banks, including Bank of 
America). Therefore, under this Article’s proposal, Bank of America would be held to the higher set of 
regulatory costs. 
 272 See Top 50 Holding Companies, NAT’L INFO. CENTER, http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/ 
top50form.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2012). 
 273 It is worth observing that the proposed adoption of a different regulatory regime for small and 
medium-sized banks, on the one hand, and systemic banks, on the other, would replicate the practice of private 
debt contracting. Banks routinely use standardized contracts when lending to small businesses or households. 
In contrast, lending to corporate clients involves detailed, lengthy, and sophisticated negotiations. 
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consistent with the new provisions introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act for 
systemic banks, capital requirements for these banks should be determined ad 
hoc274 through individual stress tests that simulate breaking-point future 
scenarios.275 A similar approach should be applied to evaluate these banks’ 
risk-based insurance premiums. Second, the set of organizational features 
implementing advocacy should be determined on a case-by-case basis.276 This 
means that the relative impact factor of a large bank’s organizational features 
on that bank’s risk appetite should be evaluated by taking into consideration a 
wide range of control variables, including its “capital structure, riskiness, 
complexity, financial activities (including the financial activities of [its] 
subsidiaries), size, and any other [appropriate] risk-related factors.”277 
Additionally, it would be desirable for regulators to include in their “checklist” 
of relevant organizational features, for example, the relative power of the 
CRO, as measured by her share of the total pay given to all the bank’s top 
executives, and the size of the CRO’s budget and staff.278 Finally, the measure 
of the trade-off between advocacy and lower regulatory costs should also be 
evaluated ad hoc, taking into consideration idiosyncratic features and the 
impact of this trade-off on a bank’s risk appetite. Most importantly, as private 
lenders do when negotiating with their debtors, regulators could ask for 
 
 274 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 115(c), 124 
Stat. 1376, 1404–05 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
 275 Bank regulators have already performed similar tests. After the crisis, the Federal Reserve, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC jointly launched the Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program. The program was tailored to estimate the losses and liquidity needs of nineteen U.S. bank holding 
companies with assets exceeding $100 billion. The test found that ten out of the nineteen banks under 
examination would have required an additional capital buffer to remain solvent. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 19–37 
(2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20090507a1.pdf. For some banks the 
required additional buffer was significant. For example, as regards the level of Tier 1 capital (i.e., common 
stock and disclosed reserves), Bank of America would have required a 19.6% increase. See id. at 21. The 
19.6% increase is obtained by dividing the SCAP buffer of Bank of America, i.e., 33.9%, by the bank’s Tier 1 
capital as of December 31, 2008, i.e., $173.2 billion. 
 276 To this end, regulators should also privilege on-site examinations and resident examiners over off-site 
monitoring through certified reports. See FDIC EVALUATION POLICIES, supra note 254, § 1.1. 
 277 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 115(a)(2)(A). 
 278 Recent empirical studies confirm that the relative power of risk managers vis-à-vis top executives, as 
measured through risk managers’ relative compensation, is among the most important determinants of banks’ 
risk management policies. This argument is supported by the fact that banks in which risk managers enjoyed 
more relative power invested less in risky assets before the crisis and performed better during the crisis. See 
Ellul & Yerramilli, supra note 203 (manuscript at 16) (finding that the presence of a risk manager with high 
relative power is negatively correlated with increased risk taking before the crisis and positively correlated 
with better performance during the crisis); Keys et al., supra note 82, at 702 (finding that relative power of risk 
managers has negative correlation with loan default rates). 
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changes in a bank’s organizational features. For example, when a bank is 
highly systemic, regulators could even demand the presence of a public 
supervisor on the bank’s board for making the trade-off between governance 
and lower regulatory costs available to that bank.279 
3. Objections 
This Article’s proposal is that making banks’ regulatory costs sensitive to 
banks’ organizational features would incentivize bank shareholders to adopt 
safe governance arrangements, adding to both the stability of individual banks 
and the banking system as whole. However, the question of how this proposal 
should be implemented is complex and open-ended. What is the optimal set of 
organizational features that regulators should focus on? How often should 
regulators evaluate a bank’s governance arrangements to avoid the risk of ex 
post shifts toward riskier governance models? These are only two of the 
additional questions that need to be addressed. It is important to emphasize, 
however, that experience would help to answer these questions. Especially in 
the case of large banks, the experience gained with one bank would provide 
information on the best course of regulatory action to undertake with other 
banks. Based on this experience, regulators could continue to impose 
governance measures that have proven successful to constrain risk and jettison 
 
 279 It is worth emphasizing that bank regulators have already taken similar initiatives under the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP). Notably, the TARP, which enabled the U.S. Department of Treasury to 
purchase toxic assets from troubled financial institutions, was a central part of the government’s effort to 
contain the systemic effect of the crisis. About TARP, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/financial-stability/about-tarp/Pages/what-did-tarp-do.aspx (last updated July 13, 2012). In particular, 
under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which was the first and largest initiative conducted within the 
general framework of the TARP, the Treasury purchased about $205 billion in senior preferred stock 
(Preferred) from troubled U.S. banks. See Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/cap/Pages/ 
overview.aspx (last updated Dec. 10, 2012). In a little-noticed part, the Treasury’s term sheet provided that 
“[i]f dividends on the Preferred are not paid in full for six dividend periods, whether or not consecutive, the 
Preferred will have the right to elect 2 directors.” See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, TARP CAPITAL PURCHASE 
PROGRAM: PREFERRED SECURITIES, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ 
Documents/term%20sheet%20%20private%20c%20corporations.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2012). Even less 
noticed was the fact that the Treasury did exercise its rights to elect board members under the CPP. In July 
2011, the Treasury announced that it had, for the first time, elected directors to the boards of two recipients of 
CPP funds that had breached the six-missed-dividend waiver: First Banks, Inc. and Royal Bancshares of 
Pennsylvania, Inc. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Elects Directors to CCP Banks’ Boards 
of Directors (July 19, 2011), available at www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1249.aspx. By 
October 2012, the Treasury had elected twenty-four board members to a total of fourteen CPP institutions. 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (TARP): MONTHLY REPORT TO 
CONGRESS–OCTOBER 2012, at 9 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/ 
reports/Documents/October%202012%20Monthly%20Report.pdf.  
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those that have not.280 Over time, regulators would also gain insights that 
would assist them in “pricing” the regulatory contracts offered to banks. And 
this, in turn, would enable them to better calibrate enforcement strategies, 
allowing for a more accurate determination of the appropriate “price 
difference” between one model and the other. 
A potential objection to the adaptive regulatory approach proposed here is 
that it would be costly. But the costs associated with implementing such an 
approach should be put into perspective against the benchmark of “the truly 
enormous, immediate, direct, long-lasting out-of-pocket expenses associated 
with bailouts.”281 In addition, this approach should not be built from scratch. 
For example, regulators could rely on the regulatory infrastructures provided 
by examination ratings. They could also count on existing deposit insurance 
rules for incorporating bank governance into the determination of deposit 
insurance premiums. Clearly, these regulations should be reformed to provide 
for real consideration of banks’ decision-making processes and give actual 
weight to governance arrangements in the determination of both deposit 
insurance premiums and capital requirements. Nevertheless, they would 
provide an important institutional setup to start from for implementing this 
Article’s reform proposal. Similarly, in the case of large, interconnected banks, 
this proposal would fit in with the institutional responsibilities and powers that 
the Dodd-Frank Act delegates to the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC). The vast range of operational powers granted to the FSOC—including 
(i) the ability to recommend the application of individual prudential standards, 
(ii) the power to request special certified reports on a variety of subject 
matters, and (iii) the implementation of studies about the feasibility of ad hoc 
capital requirements282—would largely facilitate the adoption of the individual 
“negotiation” approach. Finally, in the long run, governance-focused 
regulatory intervention might better allocate limited public resources. On the 
one hand, after enacting this regulatory scheme for some period of time, 
regulators could begin to trust banks with advocacy models. This increased 
trustworthiness in banks’ internal control mechanisms could spare regulators 
the costs of more intense scrutiny, in part “delegating” regulatory monitoring 
 
 280 It is worth observing that shareholders, through the services offered by corporate governance rating 
agencies, already use corporate governance metrics to evaluate the soundness of potential investments. See 
Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 917 (2007). While regulatory governance 
metrics should be tailored to measure stability rather than profitability, the experience of the corporate 
governance industry could serve as support to the regulatory identification of key governance features. 
 281 Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 2, at 1409. 
 282 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 115–16. 
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to banks themselves. On the other hand, these newly available resources could 
be effectively channeled toward banks with CEO-centric models, which pose 
the greatest risk. 
A more radical objection to this Article concerns the ability of bank 
shareholders to engage in active governance. Especially in large banks with 
dispersed shareholders, coordination problems could prevent the shareholders 
from engaging in the costly information-gathering process required by the 
exercise of voice. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that shareholders 
can always “vote with their feet” and discipline managers through the threat of 
exit. Bank shareholders could have acted in this way before the crisis if 
dissatisfied with their banks’ governance arrangements. Instead, they rationally 
chose to remain passive because riskier governance arrangements were 
profitable.283 But under a regulatory scheme that penalizes banks opting for 
such arrangements, shareholders would have the correct incentives to actively 
exercise their exit rights if dissatisfied with the governance choices of 
management. In addition, the rise of activist hedge funds and private equity 
funds suggests that there may be great room for shareholder voice in large 
banks.284 These investors have both the sophistication and economic resources 
to be directly involved in shaping a bank’s governance arrangements.285 The 
fact that the Federal Reserve has relaxed regulations restricting these investors’ 
ability to acquire positions in banks and bank holding companies is likely to 
 
 283 See, e.g., RAJAN, supra note 1, at 147 (observing that the high volatility of the banks’ equity market 
was matched by high equity values). 
 284 Since the rise of institutional investing in the 1980s, scholarly representations of shareholders as 
passive and uncoordinated have increasingly given way to a new shareholder rights movement. See Bernard S. 
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 522 (1990) (rebutting what he calls the 
“passivity story” as obsolete and superficial in light of the growth of institutional investors). This movement 
has strongly defended the ability of shareholders to improve managerial performance and accountability 
through active voting. In fact, in recent years, the focus of this debate has shifted from the possibility of 
shareholder democracy to its efficiency. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
 285 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1381 (2007) 
(explaining that hedge funds have been incredibly successful at using the proxy system to pursue governance 
issues); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2007) (“Hedge funds have increasingly tried to influence the business strategy 
and management of corporations.”); Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create 
Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219 
(2009) (suggesting that the great success of private equity funds is largely due to their superior ability at 
managing corporate governance issues). 
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incentivize further activism.286 With the right incentives, the governance skills 
of these investors would add to the efficiency of banking organizations.287 
A different kind of objection can be raised to the fact that this Article does 
not propose the mandatory adoption of advocacy models, given the thesis it 
develops about the efficiency of advocacy. There is a basic reason for this: for 
small, local banks, adopting advocacy models might prove too onerous. The 
requirements of having a board composed only of independent directors and a 
qualified CRO (with a structured risk management department) might be 
difficult in practice and excessively costly.288 More importantly, these added 
costs might be unjustified in contexts where the systemic risks posed by a bank 
are inherently constrained by the bank’s size. 
Finally, it is important to distinguish the advocacy approach proposed here 
and recent proposals advanced within the optimal compensation framework. 
As noted above, these proposals suggest that anchoring executive 
compensation to both a firm’s debt and a firm’s equity would per se provide a 
credible commitment to sound risk policies by banks. However, giving 
managers “non-partisan incentives,” by linking pay to the total value of a 
bank’s liabilities (including equity), is a task with serious feasibility issues, 
especially when these claims are not traded.289 In contrast, the incentive 
structure provided by advocacy is immune to these problems because it 
involves agents (i.e., the CEO and the CRO) who are left to manage their own 
partisan incentives.290 More radically, because dominant CEOs can potentially 
modify a bank’s capital structure, the commitment provided by compensation 
schemes could be unreliable. In opposition, advocacy models would be more 
 
 286 The combined provisions of the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act and Federal Reserve Regulation Y 
have historically required investors who gain “control” in banks (and bank holding companies) to register as a 
bank holding company, subjecting these investors to more stringent regulation and supervision. See Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 225.1 (2012). In 2008, however, the 
Federal Reserve relaxed prior regulation. Investors can now seek to influence certain governance matters 
without being held to have acquired a controlling interest. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
POLICY STATEMENT ON EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN BANKS AND BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 6–12 (2008), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20080922b1.pdf. 
 287 See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 285, at 259 (“There may be great opportunities for private equity to 
become involved in improving the operations of [financial] institutions.”). 
 288 Moreover, the costs that a bank bears to implement an advocacy model are likely to be private 
information. 
 289 See Sepe, supra note 36, at 211; see also Bhagat & Romano, supra note 52, at 370 (suggesting that 
feasibility issues might prevent firms from implementing executive compensation packages that adequately 
calibrate managers’ risk incentives). 
 290 See Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 174, at 5 (arguing that advocacy systems are superior to systems 
where “a single agent is given a nonpartisan incentive scheme” to pursue simultaneously conflicting causes). 
SEPE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2013 9:57 AM 
404 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:327 
difficult to change because modifying a firm’s governance model requires time 
and involves complex procedures. Finally, managerial compensation contracts 
are always subject to contractual incompleteness problems, even if adjusted 
frequently. Both idiosyncratic and non-idiosyncratic factors, such as variations 
of the business cycle, could cause these problems.291 Conversely, the 
combination of organizational rules and decisional bodies that form a firm’s 
internal governance structure is exactly designed to solve similar problems in a 
timely and contingent manner, especially in the case of advocacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Shareholders and debtholders have conflicting preferences over risk taking, 
especially in banks. This conflict is generally mitigated by negotiations 
between the parties. But when debt claims are insured, debtholders lose their 
incentives to participate in negotiation. Thus, bank shareholders, unconstrained 
by debt discipline, have no incentives to seek governance arrangements that 
constrain risk taking. Instead, in this environment, the risk-prone, CEO-centric 
model becomes the norm. 
Institutionally, there are three potential responses to this outcome that can 
help to preserve banking stability. First, regulators can solve the debt–equity 
conflict at the investor level, mandating that banks be government-owned.292 
However, the efficiency gains of this solution are questionable. Second, 
regulators can mandatorily require banks to compensate their managers with 
schedules that calibrate risk-taking incentives. However, compensation 
contracts are necessarily incomplete, leaving room for residual managerial 
opportunism. The third solution is to promote a corporate governance system 
 
 291 When the manager’s compensation contract is sensitive to risk (such as the implicit volatility of bank 
assets), it is exposed to the countercyclical effects of exogenous factors. For example, during times of high 
volatility, the manager could be too conservative with respect to the optimal level of risk. Conversely, during 
times of low volatility, the manager could undertake too much risk. 
 292 Government-owned banking is widespread worldwide: in the early 2000s about 40% of bank assets in 
emerging market banking systems were held in state-run banks. Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership 
of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265, 275 (2002). For a critical assessment, see Levine, supra note 93, at 12, which 
observed that government might have “less benevolent motivations than enhancing the corporate governance 
of banks.” In the midst of the crisis, Nobel Economist Joseph Stiglitz provocatively suggested that both the 
U.S. and the U.K. governments would have benefitted from letting troubled banks fail and setting up a new 
banking system under temporary state control. See Judy Chen, Stiglitz Says U.S. Is Paying for Failure to 
Nationalize Banks, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1, 2009, 1:10 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aGR4KXaGwxd8; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Let Banks Fail, Says Nobel Economist Joseph 
Stiglitz, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 2, 2009, 12:44 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/ 
banksandfinance/4424418/Let-banks-fail-says-Nobel-economist-Joseph-Stiglitz.html. 
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that attempts to solve the debt–equity conflict within the bank. This Article has 
argued for this third position. 
To implement a governance solution, the contractarian approach is the most 
desirable: regulators would substitute themselves for a complacent class of 
insured debtholders. Under this substitution hypothesis, regulators would 
discipline banks as debtholders would in a world without government 
insurance. Shareholders would respond by adopting safe governance 
arrangements in the hope of minimizing regulatory costs. But this change 
would require regulators to adopt governance as a centerpiece in the regulatory 
regime. Instead, existing regulation focuses on capital requirements, with only 
superficial references to banks’ governance arrangements. This blunt approach 
is socially expensive and maintains the CEO-centric status quo. In order to 
remedy this inefficiency, this Article has suggested that bank regulators should 
negotiate with banks over an expanded domain of regulatory options, offering 
lower costs to banks that adopt safe governance structures. 
Framing the specific regulatory options that will fulfill this objective is a 
daunting task. This Article has presented a tentative solution, conceptualizing 
safe governance arrangements in banks as a model of advocacy. Under this 
model, an advocate for the debtholders, for example the CRO, would serve as 
antagonist to the CEO, who, in turn, would act as an advocate for bank 
shareholders. The rivalry between the CEO and the CRO within the bank’s 
decision-making process would foster unbiased decision making and promote 
more socially responsible risk taking.293 To this end, regulators should make 
capital requirements and deposit insurance premiums sensitive to banks’ 
governance features. Small and medium-sized banks could receive a fixed set 
of regulatory options, while large banks could negotiate directly with 
regulators in a closer simulation of debtholder–shareholder bargaining. This 
latter approach would prevent an outcome where large banks exploited the 
trade-off between safe governance and lower regulatory costs in a manner that 
is privately optimal but socially inefficient. 
Refining this implementation strategy, and developing empirical evidence, 
is a challenge for future research. But a discussion of the potential for 
 
 293 Cf. Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex 
Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 808 (2010) (arguing that 
intellectual hazard and conceptual biases may impair “the acquisition, analysis, communication, and 
implementation of information within an organization” and that these factors played a fundamental role in the 
2008 crisis). 
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advocacy in banks is a first step toward bringing banks’ governance practice 
closer to banks’ governance theory. 
